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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The time is ripe for a non-doctrinal assessment of Justice Jackson’s famous three-
category framework for challenges to presidential action, elaborated in Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer (also known as the Steel Seizure Case).  Recent national security controversies 
have given the Youngstown framework a whole new lease on life, and its relevance for courts, 
Congress, and executive branch officials has never been higher.  During the same period, 
empirical and analytical studies of presidential policymaking have advanced beyond personality-
driven accounts of particular administrations.  Together, these developments offer a terrific 
opportunity to assess how well the Youngstown framework fulfills its objective of advancing 
congressional interests and constraining presidential power. 
 
A political economy approach better explains the problem to which Justice Jackson was 
responding – the capacity of presidential unilateralism to establish policy that can withstand 
statutory correction, regardless of whether it has a legal basis – and also explains more formally 
how Youngstown’s categories offer a practical, if legally unorthodox, constraint.  The assessment 
becomes more negative, though, once those categories are treated endogenously – that is, once 
the political branches are modeled as behaving dynamically and reacting to the framework itself.  
For example, both empirical surveys of executive orders and case studies suggest that the 
President may react to the risk of legislative disapproval (which under Youngstown will likely 
result in judicial disapproval as well) by avoiding Congress altogether or by seeking only its 
indirect blessing.  Because these and other results disserve the framework’s objectives, this 
Article proposes several more benign alternatives – and, in general, advocates re-seizing Steel 
Seizure. 
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THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF YOUNGSTOWN 
 
Edward T. Swaine† 
 
   
INTRODUCTION 
Everybody loves Youngstown Sheet & Tube, also known as the Steel Seizure 
Case1 – and how could they not?  The decision establishes that the President is governed 
by the law and by the courts, kind of a Marbury v. Madison for the executive branch;2 
better yet, it did so despite appeals to wartime exigencies, and so reinforced the 
immutability of constitutional principles.3  Youngstown is one of the most celebrated 
cases dealing with the separation of powers, and even contends for best in show.4 
Justice Jackson’s concurrence is even more beloved.  This may have been 
unexpected: he wrote only for himself (there were five such solo concurrences) under 
                                                 
† Associate Professor, George Washington University Law School.  For comments on earlier 
drafts, I am grateful to participants in the annual meeting of the International Law in Domestic Courts 
section of the American Society of International Law and at the Potomac Foreign Relations Law 
Roundtable, including in particular Curt Bradley, Brannon Denning, Maeva Marcus, Jeremy Rabkin, Carlos 
Vazquez, and Steve Vladeck.  I also received very helpful research assistance from Andrew Nolan and 
Bonnie Chen. 
1 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).  The fact that the decision is 
well known by two names, like some celebrities, is independent testimony to its fame.  
2 Michael Stokes Paulsen, Youngstown Goes to War, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 215, 217-18 (2002) 
(“Youngstown is to executive power what Marbury v. Madison is to legislative power, only more so. 
Marbury was, at most, a weak assertion of judicial power over the legislature . . . Youngstown, in contrast, 
is a bold assertion of judicial power over the conduct of the President . . . .”). 
3 Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 703 (1997) (stating that “we have long held that when the 
president takes official action, the Court has the authority to determine whether he has acted within the 
law,” but citing Youngstown as “[p]erhaps the most dramatic example of such a case”); Louis Fisher, 
Foreword to MAEVA MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER, at ix (1994) (citing the decision as “one of the rare occasions when the Court has rebuked a 
presidential act in wartime”); see also Patricia L. Bellia, The Story of the Steel Seizure Case, in 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER STORIES 233 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009) (stating that 
“[s]ome observers regard the Steel Seizure case . . . as a turning point in the Court’s handling of politically 
charged constitutional questions”). 
4 David Gray Adler, The Steel Seizure Case and Inherent Presidential Power, 19 CONST. 
COMMENT. 155, 156 (2002) (“Justly celebrated . . . for its landmark status and deserving rank in the 
pantheon of great cases--alongside Marbury, McCulloch, and Brown – Youngstown has been assured of 
immortality in the annals of constitutional jurisprudence.”); id. at 156-67 (“When measured against 
Youngstown, . . .’all other [separation of powers] cases pale into insignificance.’  Youngstown featured the 
most thorough judicial exploration of presidential powers in the history of the Republic, and it constituted 
the most significant judicial commentary in the 20th century on the limits of those powers.”) (quoting C. 
Herman Pritchett, Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court 206 (1954)). 
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considerable time pressure (probably contributing to the need to write separately),5 and 
his contemporaries were not bowled over.6  But with time, buoyed by Jackson’s growing 
reputation as a jurist, his concurrence’s signal contribution – a nifty three-tiered approach 
that looked approvingly on presidential action taken with the approval of Congress 
(Category One), virtually condemned action taken contrary to Congress’ will (Category 
Three), and cast other actions into a “zone of twilight” (Category Two)7 – has become 
Youngstown’s enduring legacy.  When the decision’s fiftieth anniversary was celebrated,8 
Justice Jackson’s approach, lately dubbed the “Youngstown framework,”9 was the subject 
of particular acclaim, and it is widely accepted that his opinion is one of the Court’s all-
time greats. 
For some time, one could dismiss this as academic ardor.  When Youngstown was 
rendered, Jackson’s concurrence (and his sixth vote supporting the majority) had no 
direct effect on the result.10  Even as critical appreciation for the framework grew, its 
utility for courts lagged, not least because the circumstances of the underlying dispute 
                                                 
5 Bellia, supra note 3, at 256-60 (reviewing conference notes); see infra text accompanying note 
52 et seq. (describing opinions). 
6 See, e.g., Edward S. Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53 
COLUM. L. REV. 53, 63 (1953) (“Justice Jackson’s rather desultory opinion contains little that is of direct 
pertinence to the constitutional issue.”); Paul G. Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case: Congress, the President, 
and the Supreme Court, 51 MICH. L. REV. 141, 166 n.71 (1952) (describing substantial part of Justice 
Jackson’s opinion as “in the nature of a gratuitious discussion, although an interesting and valuable one,” 
given the issues in controversy); id. at 175 n.97 (same); id. at 176 (same); id. at 180 (describing position 
shared by Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, Burton, and Clark as “an adequate and sound ground for 
disposition of the case”).  A contemporary celebration of Justice Jackson’s career praised his Youngstown 
opinion only in a footnote concerning Jackson’s inconsistencies – and omitted any mention of the 
framework that is the subject here.  Louis L. Jaffe, Mr. Justice Jackson, 68 HARV. L. REV. 940, 989 n.199 
(1955). 
7 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
8 See, e.g., Ken Gormley, Foreword: President Truman and The Steel Seizure Case: A Symposium, 
41 DUQ. L. REV. 667 (2003); Youngstown at Fifty: A Symposium (Dedication and Forward), 19 CONST. 
COMM. 1 (2002).  Stanford Law School actually reheard the case and co-produced a multimedia 
extravaganza.  Presidential Power in Times of Crisis: 
The Steel Seizure Case Revisited, http://steelseizure.stanford.edu/; see also Charles C. Hileman et al., 
Supreme Court Law Clerks’ Recollection of October Term 1951, Including the Steel Seizure Cases, 82 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 1239 (2008) (published on occasion of fifty-fifth anniversary). 
9 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1368 (2008). 
10 But see infra note 64 (noting Justice Clark’s pledge to change his own vote). 
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were rarely replicated.11  Some celebrating the decision earlier this decade asked 
despairingly whether Youngstown was one-of-a-kind.12   
What a difference a war makes – especially an unpopular one.13  In the wake of 
President Bush’s first-term controversies, his Supreme Court nominees sounded 
obeisance to Jackson’s framework during their confirmation hearings.14  This proved to 
be more than lip service.  By the end of the October 2007 Term, Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justice Alito had joined every other member of that Court in subscribing to the 
Youngstown framework.15  Others failed to heed it at their peril.  When the Office of 
                                                 
11 Justice Jackson’s framework was not invoked until Justice Powell’s separate opinion in Nixon v. 
Administrator of General Services, when it was cited – somewhat cryptically – in support of the contention 
that the President could waive a constitutional objection, based on Article II, to an otherwise valid 
congressional act.  Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 503 n.6 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment).  Its first prominent role was in Dames & Moore v. Regan, where it 
was not shown to its best advantage.  See infra text accompanying notes 22, 178-188. 
12 Neal Devins & Louis Fisher, The Steel Seizure Case: One of a Kind?, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 63, 
81-83, 85, 86 (2002).  
13 Devins and Fisher, who focused on congressional control of the war-making power, suggested 
that Youngstown would become more relevant when Congress and the public had turned against an 
unpopular war.  Devins & Fisher, supra note 12, at 86.  Others, agreeing with the perception but extracting 
a different lesson, suggested that Youngstown’s legacy is simply “the tendency of judges to pile on a 
politically weakened president after the heat of the emergency has cooled.”  ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN 
VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 51 (Oxford University Press 
2007). 
Between the Korean and Iraq conflicts, Youngstown had experienced at least a minor resurgence 
roughly coterminous with President Nixon’s second term and the winding down of the Vietnam War.  See, 
for example, the expanding discussion in GERALD GUNTHER & NOEL T. DOWLING (DEC’D), CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 571-72 (8th ed. 1970), and GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 414-16 (9th ed. 1975); see also PAUL BREST, PROCESSES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 404-05 (1975). 
14 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the 
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005) (testimony of John G. 
Roberts, Jr.); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate Justice of 
the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 318 (2006) 
(testimony of Samuel A. Alito) (indicating agreement with Jackson approach as “a very useful framework,” 
remarking that “it doesn’t answer every question that comes up in this area, but it provides a very useful 
way of looking at them”).  This went over well with the Senate.  152 CONG. REC. S340, S345 (Jan. 31, 
2006) (remarks of Sen. Spector); 152 CONG. REC. S260, S306 (Jan. 30, 2006) (same); 151 CONG. REC. 
S10481, S10483 (Sept. 27, 2005) (remarks of Sen. Dodd, opposing in other respects the nomination of 
Judge Roberts); id. at S10484 (remarks of Sen. Reed, opposing in other respects the nomination of Judge 
Roberts). 
15 In fact, the two justices Roberts and Alito replaced could also be added, since they too had 
recently subscribed to Justice Jackson’s framework.  See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1368 (2008) 
(Roberts, C.J., joined by Alito, Kennedy, Scalia, & Thomas, JJ.); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 
(2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring, joined by Breyer, Ginsburg, & Souter, JJ.); Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade 
Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (Souter, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, 
Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ.); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
Justice Sotomayor has not yet had a chance to opine, but there is no indication that she has a different view.  
See infra text accompanying note 21. 
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Legal Counsel (OLC)’s so-called Torture Memo was released,16 its authors were 
lambasted for neglecting Justice Jackson’s concurrence.17  A similar oversight reportedly 
helped spur OLC’s internal reconsideration of memoranda on the National Security 
Agency’s terrorist surveillance program (TSP);18 perhaps forewarned by the Torture 
                                                 
16 Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of 
Justice to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under 18 
U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (Aug. 1, 2002). 
17 See, e.g., FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ JR. & AZIZ Z. HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR 195-96 (2007) (describing “more significant omission” in the 
torture memos of “the most recent and authoritative opinion on presidential powers in wartime: the 
Youngstown case” – by which the authors mean Justice Jackson’s opinion – and cataloging indictments of 
this failing); Stephen Gillers, The Torture Memo, THE NATION, Apr. 9, 2008 (likening failure to heed 
Youngstown to “advising a client on school desegregation law and ignoring Brown v. Board of Education”); 
Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive Power, 54 
UCLA L. REV. 1559, 1568, 1585 (2007) (criticizing the opinion for failing to cite or apply “the watershed 
Supreme Court opinion most relevant to assessing the constitutionality of the statute: Justice Jackson’s 
three-part [Youngstown] framework”); Neil Kinkopf, The Statutory Commander in Chief, 81 IND. L.J. 
1169, 1171 (2006) (arguing that “fail[ing] even to cite to Justice Jackson’s seminal opinion from 
Youngstown” was “no mere violation of citation etiquette, for it led OLC to fail to acknowledge that 
Congress has any relevant authority whatsoever”); Stephen Rohde, War By Other Means, LOS ANGELES 
LAWYER, Feb. 2007, at 44 (reviewing JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER'S ACCOUNT OF THE 
WAR ON TERROR (2006)) (“A first-year associate would have been fired for writing a memo on the 
president's war powers without addressing Youngstown.  For Yoo to do so while advising the president of 
the United States is unconscionable.”); Bradley R. Wendell, Professionalism As Interpretation, 99 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1167, 1172 n.18 (2005) (describing the failure to cite or distinguish Youngstown as a “either blatant 
incompetence or highly tendentious advocacy”).  The criticism was sounded in congressional hearings, see 
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Alberto R. Gonzales to be Attorney General of the United 
States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 534-37 (2005) (statement of Dean 
Harold Hongju Koh) (condemning the failure to cite Youngstown and Justice Jackson’s concurrence as “a 
stunning failure of lawyerly craft”), and in pursuit of academic sanctions.  See, e.g., David Glenn, “Torture 
Memos” vs. Academic Freedom, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., March 20, 2009, at A12; Letter from 
Professor J. Bradford DeLong to Chancellor Robert Birgeneau at 1 (Feb. 16, 2009), available at 
http://braddelong.posterous.com/letter-to-chancellor-birgeneau (criticizing “failure to make any reference 
to the Korean War case of Youngstown, an essential part of any good-faith analysis of the war powers of 
the President”). 
Certainly the mere failure to cite Youngstown does not necessarily mean that it was being ignored.  
See MARCUS, supra note 3, at 358 n.31 (citing opinion of former OLC official that its attorneys “do not 
often cite” Youngstown, “but it is always in the back of their minds”); JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: 
AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON TERROR 185 (2007) (claiming that among the critics were those 
who had, in comparable circumstances, failed to emphasize Youngstown); see infra note 208 (noting 
another failure to cite the framework).  The real objection, presumably, was that the memorandum erred 
because it disregarded binding precedent and failed to convey legal risks.  
18 See Offices of the Inspector Gen. of the Dep’t of Def., Dep’t of Justice, CIA, NSA, and Office 
of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Unclassified Report on the President’s Surveillance Program 13 (July 10, 
2009) (No. 2009-0013-AS) [hereinafter Unclassified IG Report] (noting apparent omission of Youngstown 
analysis in the yet-classified OLC memos drafted in 2001 by John Yoo, and asserting that “Justice 
Jackson’s analysis of President Truman’s Article II Commander-in-Chief authority during wartime in the 
Youngstown case was an important factor in OLC’s subsequent reevaluation of Yoo’s opinions on the 
legality of the [Presidential Surveillance Program]”).  The TSP was only one component of the President’s 
Surveillance Program (PSP), id. at 1 n.1 (quoting Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendments Act of 
2008, tit. III, § 301(a)(3)), but discussion here will focus on the former, since the ensuing debate about 
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Memo controversy, once the TSP was disclosed, both its critics and defenders pitched 
their cases in the framework’s terms.19  The lesson seems to have transcended President 
Bush’s administration.  President Obama’s nominee for Attorney General lavished 
attention on Justice Jackson’s concurrence during his confirmation hearing, saying it “set 
out in really wonderful form” the proper approach to presidential power;20 Justice 
Sotomayor likewise invoked Youngstown and Justice Jackson during her own hearings.21   
Over the long haul, but with a flurry near the end, Justice Jackson’s framework 
has insinuated itself into the Youngstown majority.22  Along the way, the framework has 
                                                                                                                                                 
constitutional authority was at least nominally directed at the TSP.  See infra text accompanying note 217 
et seq.  
19 Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to the 
Leadership of the Senate Select Comm. on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Comm. on 
Intelligence at 1 (Dec. 23, 2005), reprinted in 81 IND. L.J. 1360, 1360-61 (2006) [hereinafter Moschella 
Letter]; January 9, 2006 Letter from Scholars & Former Gov’t Officials to Congressional Leadership in 
Response to Justice Dep’t Letter of December 22, 2005, reprinted in 81 IND. L.J. 1364, 1367-68 (2006) 
[hereinafter January 9 Scholars’ Letter]; United States Dep’t of Justice, Legal Auth. Supporting the 
Activities of the Nat’l Sec. Agency Described by the President (Jan. 19, 2006), reprinted in 81 IND. L.J. 
1374, 1383 (2006) [hereinafter DOJ Legal Authorities]; February 2, 2006 Letter from Scholars and Former 
Gov’t Officials to Congressional Leadership in Response to Justice Dep’t Whitepaper of January 19, 2006, 
reprinted in 81 IND. L.J. 1415, 1417-18 (2006) [hereinafter February 2 Scholars’ Letter]; see also 
Memorandum from David Kris, former Assistant Deputy Attorney Gen. 8 (Jan. 25, 2006), available at 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/kris.fisa.pdf. 
20 General Holder spent more time on only one Supreme Court case: Heller v. District of 
Columbia., 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008), a recent case in which he had participated on the losing side. See Senate 
Confirmation Hearings: Eric Holder Day One, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/16/us/politics/16text-holder.html?pagewanted=all. 
21 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to be Associate Justice of the 
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/14/us/politics/14confirm-text.html?_r=2&ref=global-
home&pagewanted=all (stating, in response to question concerning presidential authority to disregard 
statute encroaching on what are alleged to be presidential prerogatives, that “Justice Jackson has sort of set 
off the framework in an articulation that no one's thought of a better way to make it. (Chuckles.)”). 
22 See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1368 (2008) (“Justice Jackson's familiar tripartite 
scheme provides the accepted framework for evaluating executive action in this area.”); Dames & Moore v. 
Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981) (stating that “[Justice Jackson’s] concurring opinion in Youngstown . . . 
both parties agree brings together as much combination of analysis and common sense as there is in this 
area”); CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT WARRANTLESS 
ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE TO GATHER FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION 5 (2006) (“The Steel 
Seizure Case is not remembered as much for the majority opinion as it is for the concurring opinion of 
Justice Robert Jackson, who . . .  . laid out what is commonly regarded as the seminal explication of 
separation-of-powers matters between Congress and the President.”); H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE 
PRESIDENT’S AUTHORITY OVER FOREIGN AFFAIRS 24 (2004) (stating that Justice Jackson’s opinion “has 
become in effect the lead opinion in the case”); Bernadette Meyler, Economic Emergency and the Rule of 
Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 539, 561 (2007) (calling Jackson's concurrence “the opinion that has 
subsequently proved the most influential”).  This subsequent endorsement makes it difficult for those 
rendering advice to dismiss it as “representing his views alone” or merely his “individual views.”  YOO, 
supra note 17, at 184. 
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not only transcended its original context to speak to presidential authority in all settings,23 
but somehow leapt into the active consciousness of members of Congress and the 
executive branch.  Michael Gerhardt, citing Youngstown as an example of “super 
precedent,” added that: 
Supreme Court Justices for years have given special deference to 
the concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in that case. Members 
of Congress routinely cite Youngstown in separation of powers 
discussions. They, too, tend to defer to Justice Jackson's 
concurrence, often referencing it in confirmation hearings. 
Presidents similarly have pledged fidelity to Youngstown, 
frequently citing Jackson's concurrence as authority. Jackson's 
concurrence . . . provides a roadmap for lawmakers to follow.24  
Such universal acclaim is suspicious – everybody loved Raymond, after all25 – 
and the recent relevance of Youngstown presents a unique opportunity for reassessment.  
Given its renaissance, the question now is less whether the Youngstown framework is 
influential than whether its influence is constructive, and there is cause for doubt.  
Nothing in this evaluation turns on the old objection that Jackson’s approach somehow 
undermined executive power.  The immediate result in Youngstown was certainly 
defensible: even some strong proponents of presidential power did not favor President 
Truman’s side.26  Nor did Justice Jackson’s approach do any particular disservice to the 
President’s constitutional authority, either in his construction of Article II or by 
suggesting that some presidential authority is defeasible by Congress.27  (Indeed, Jackson 
                                                 
23 Including those in which presidential prerogatives are traditionally supreme.  See, e.g., Sarah H. 
Cleveland, Hamdi Meets Youngstown: Justice Jackson’s Wartime Security Jurisprudence and the 
Detention of “Enemy Combatants”, 68 ALB. L. REV. 1127, 1128 (2005) (“It is impossible to exaggerate the 
significance of Justice Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown for U.S. foreign relations jurisprudence.”). 
24 Michael J. Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. Rev. 1204, 1217 (2006). 
25 The title was meant to be ironic, but then, ironically, the show in fact proved to be broadly 
popular – meaning that the claim had to be taken seriously, and disproven.  See, e.g., Virginia Heffernan, 
Why Does Everybody Love Raymond?, SLATE, Nov. 21, 2002, http://www.slate.com/?id=2074388.  
26 See, e.g., Corwin, supra note 6, at 65 (endorsing Justice Clark’s concurrence, which emphasized 
the incompatibility of President Truman’s order with the Taft-Hartley Act). 
27 As discussed briefly below, Justice Jackson’s opinion did reject claims that the President’s 
authority might be rooted in “[t]he executive Power,” the Commander in Chief clause, and the Take Care 
Clause, as well as inherent authority accruing via custom – recognizing in each case the possibility of 
congressional limitation.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640-52 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (citing Youngstown for 
the proposition that “a state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the rights of the 
Nation's citizens”); id. at 552 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (claiming that “it is 
instructive to recall Justice Jackson's observation that the President is not Commander in Chief of the 
country, only of the military”).  For one objection, see “The Powers of War and Peace”; The Constitution 
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was generous in some regards, insofar as he suggested that the President might 
sometimes have plenary authority enabling him to defy Congress.28)  Those objecting on 
this score must engage Jackson’s position that while the answers to specific inquiries 
about presidential authority are beyond our ken, the overall authority of the modern 
President certainly exceeds the constitutional design.29  As a practical matter, finally, 
Article II criticisms of Jackson’s concurrence have never gained much traction, save 
perhaps within the executive branch – and, as already noted, they seem to backfire 
whenever they have surfaced.  We can put this quarrel to one side. 
The more serious and unexplored problem is that the conventional argument in 
favor of Jackson’s approach – that it better secures congressional authority30 – may well 
be backwards.  To be sure, it has long been obvious that the Youngstown framework was 
                                                                                                                                                 
and Foreign Affairs after 9/11, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Jan. 13, 2006 Friday 01:00 PM, available on 
LEXIS, ALLNEWS FILE, (remarks of John Yoo) (“I am not a big fan of the concurrence by Justice Jackson. . . 
I have long thought Justice Jackson's concurrence is more of a statement about politics, and a true one, than 
one of constitutional law. How could, for example, Congress pass a statute prohibiting the President from 
exercising a power given to him under the Constitution?”); id. (indicating approval of Justice Black’s 
majority opinion).  For one evaluation of how aggressive application of the Youngstown framework may 
disserve executive power, see Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadows, 19 CONST. 
COMMENT. 87 (2002). 
28 See Stephen I. Vladeck, Congress, the Commander-in-Chief, and the Separation of Powers 
After Hamdan, 16 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 933, 955 (2007) (noting that “we might well trace 
the origins of the override theory [pursued in recent executive branch memoranda] to Justice Jackson”); 
e.g., John Yoo, Why We Endorsed Warrantless Wiretaps, WALL ST. J., July 16, 2009 (minimizing 
significance of Youngstown for “military strategy or tactics in war,” and claiming that “[i]f anything, it 
supports the proposition that one branch cannot intrude on the clear constitutional turf of another”).  
29 See infra text accompanying note 65.  This poses an obvious issue of determining the right 
baseline for purposes of constitutional and political analysis.  See Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A. Posner, 
Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307, 360-61 (2006); M. 
Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603 
(2001). 
30 POWELL, supra note 22, at 24 (explaining that Youngstown “is a mainstay of the pro-
congressional perspective, and unsurprisingly so,” and that Justice Jackson’s concurrence “is often seen as 
a pro-congressional document as well”); Bellia, supra note 3, at 271 (noting claim by scholars “that the 
framework embodies a normative commitment to congressional ‘primacy’ in foreign affairs”); Jules Lobel, 
Emergency Power and the Decline of Liberalism, 98 YALE L.J. 1385 (1989) (noting that “advocates of 
congressional authority look to Youngstown . . . as the basis for imposing limits on executive authority”); 
Adam J. White, Justice Jackson’s Draft Opinions in the Steel Seizure Cases, 69 ALB. L. REV. 1107, 1122 
(2006) (considering it “obvious” that “Jackson’s Youngstown opinion has long been favored by proponents 
of congressional authority”); e.g., HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 105-
113 (1990); Harold Hongju Koh, Can the President Be Torturer in Chief?, 81 IND. L.J. 1145, 1155 (2006); 
see also JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS 
AFTERMATH 147 n.53 (1993) (describing Youngstown as “a naked ‘legislative power’ vs. ‘executive power’ 
case”); ROBERT M. PALLITTO & WILLIAM G. WEAVER, PRESIDENTIAL SECRECY AND THE LAW 6-7 (2007) 
(depicting rivalry between strong claims to presidential power, based on Curtiss-Wright, and Justice 
Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence);. 
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open to manipulation, and that this might contribute to its near-universal appeal.  
Professor Neal Katyal observed ruefully that recent litigation “showcases just how much 
of an empty vessel Justice Jackson’s three canonical categories in his famous Youngstown 
concurrence are,” and speculated that “Youngstown’s framework has become the gold 
standard, perhaps because its all-things-to-all-people quality can provide arguments 
favoring any branch of government under many circumstances.”31  The problem is more 
severe than this suggests.  The framework is not just an empty vessel; to the contrary, it 
affects the behavior of relevant institutions – namely, the President, Congress, and the 
courts – in ways that undermine its supposed objectives.  If the Youngstown framework is 
not merely of dubious utility, but also backfires, serious attention should be given to its 
repudiation.   Steel Seizure should be re-seized. 
Part I briefly describes Youngstown.  Part II then offers a partial defense of the 
Youngstown framework based on insights from modern political science, which 
increasingly employs rational choice models of the interaction between the President and 
Congress.32  A simple spatial schematic is used to explain both the problem to which 
Justice Jackson was reacting – the President’s capacity to act unilaterally in ways that 
Congress cannot meaningfully constrain – and the nature of his solution, which 
constructs and enforces Congress’ unadopted preferences as a counterweight to the 
President’s capacity for initiative.   As an ex post solution, at least, the Youngstown 
framework has advantages that have not to date been fully appreciated.   
Part III – the heart of the Article – describes some less salutary effects that result 
when the President and Congress are allowed to react, dynamically, to the Youngstown 
                                                 
31 Neal Kumar Katyal, Comment, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term -- Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The 
Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 69 n.16 (2006); see also Adrian Vermeule, Our 
Schmittian Administrative Law, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1095, 1141-42 (2009) (“In a world of multiple and very 
vague statutory delegations bearing on national security, foreign relations, and emergency powers, judges 
have a great deal of freedom--not infinite freedom, of course-- to assign Youngstown categories to support 
the decisions they want to reach, rather than reach decisions based on the Youngstown categories.”). 
32 The core of this approach, adopted here as well, seeks to understand the President and Congress 
as rational actors engaged in attempting to achieve particular policy objectives within a relatively structured 
and stylized institutional setting – dispensing, for example, with the tendency of presidential studies toward 
normative or descriptive analyses of a particular President’s administrative preferences, governing style, or 
personality.  See WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE POLITICS OF DIRECT 
PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 24-25 (2003) [hereinafter Howell 2003]; William G. Howell, Executives – the 
American Presidency, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 303, 303-08 (R.A.W. 
Rhodes, Sarah A. Binder, & Bert A. Rockman eds., 2006). 
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framework.  In an ideal world, the President might react by seeking legislative 
authorization, the better to immunize his action from adverse review.  Numerous 
empirical studies of executive orders suggest, however, that the President seeks to avoid 
legislative overruling.  Based on these analyses, and case studies involving recent 
invocations of Youngstown, Part III both revises the schematic and tenders several 
hypotheses about presidential and congressional decision-making in the shadow of 
Youngstown, namely that: (1) a President’s reluctance to risk review at Justice Jackson’s 
“lowest ebb” will tend to discourage seeking congressional authorization at all; (2) the 
sufficiency within the framework of implied legislative authorization diminishes the 
President’s incentive to seek explicit authorization; (3) the President will seek to defuse 
any adverse expressions of congressional with interpretive techniques that may confound 
the framework; and (4) attributing categorical significance to congressional action (or 
inaction) tends to substitute judicial for congressional judgment.  These effects may be 
marginal, as is repeatedly stressed, but all the same must be appreciated as likely 
consequences of Justice Jackson’s approach – and taken together, they suggest a 
potentially serious, perverse result from an otherwise laudatory precedent. 
Part IV, finally, sketches possible avenues for reform.  After noting the possibility 
that the courts might simply reform their application of the Youngstown framework, it 
considers expanding the use of soft law and framework statutes as supplementary 
measures.  As a thought experiment, it then sets out an alternative framework that would 
inquire as to the legal bases for executive branch action without inspiring any pronounced 
strategic behavior by the President or other institutions.  A brief conclusion follows.   
Sadly, an additional caveat may be in order.  Regardless of whether the 
Youngstown framework is counterproductive, Youngstown remains binding law, 
including – to the extent it has been adopted as precedent by the Supreme Court or the 
lower courts – Justice Jackson’s concurrence.  Nothing here suggests that the executive 
branch or anyone else is free to ignore relevant constitutional authority.33  The point 
                                                 
33 I do contend, however, that the categorical aspects of Justice Jackson’s concurrence – what I 
mean by the Youngstown framework – may be misapplied outside the court, and suggest that consideration 
be given to suspending this use.  See infra Part IV. 
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instead is that the framework should be employed with a fuller understanding of its 
consequences, particularly by those institutions that seemed to be its principal audience. 
I. YOUNGSTOWN REVISITED 
The basic facts of Youngstown – the political circumstances, the litigation, and the 
opinions ultimately rendered by the Supreme Court – are so widely understood that only 
the briefest recounting is necessary.34  The whole affair was precipitated by North 
Korea’s invasion of South Korea in 1950, which compelled President Truman to send 
U.S. troops to South Korea’s assistance.  The process by which Truman reached this 
decision was a harbinger of the later litigation; Truman failed to consult much with 
Congress beforehand, or seek congressional ratification immediately afterward,35 
excusing the failure to observe protocol on grounds that the United States was “not at 
war”36 and had received the Security Council’s blessing.37   Truman’s path may have 
been influenced by his political standing at the time, which made working with Congress 
difficult.38  Even so, he probably underestimated the political benefits of securing early 
legislative support, as well as the costs of delaying.39 Ironically, when Truman later 
sought legislative support, some in Congress invoked his earlier claim that it was 
unnecessary.40   
More to the point, authorization to use force might have resolved problems that 
haunted Truman on the domestic front, which were the more immediate subject of 
                                                 
34 For particularly comprehensive and insightful discussions, see MARCUS, supra note 3; ALAN F. 
WESTIN, THE ANATOMY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE (1995 ed.) (reprinting excerpts from key 
documents); Bellia, supra note 3, at 235-56. 
35 MARCUS, supra note 3, at 1-3; GLENN D. PAIGE, THE KOREAN DECISION 187-91 (1968). 
36 The President’s News Conference of June 29, 1950, PUB. PAPERS, Harry S. Truman, 1950 at 
503 (1965), available at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=806&st=&st1=) (“We 
are not at war.”). 
37 Complaint of Aggression upon the Republic of Korea, S.C. Res. 83, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511 
(June 27, 1950).  For citations to the literature contesting and defending Truman’s claim, see Edward T. 
Swaine, Taking Care of Treaties, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 391 n.316 (2008); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. 
Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2060 n.43 
(2005).  
38 Secretary of State Acheson advised Truman against seeking a joint resolution supporting his 
decision, for fear that it give members of Congress a platform for attacking the President’s approach and 
undermining troop morale.  PAIGE, supra note 35, at 187. 
39 ROBERT J. DONOVAN, TUMULTUOUS YEARS: THE PRESIDENCY OF HARRY S. TRUMAN, 1949–
1953, at 217-24 (1982). 
40 MARCUS, supra note 3, at 3.  Some, on the other hand, asked Truman why Congress had not 
been consulted.  PAIGE, supra note 35, at 190 n.14. 
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interest in Youngstown.41  A serious labor-management dispute came to threaten steel 
production, which was considered essential to the war effort.  Truman attempted through 
various means to resolve the dispute, including by referring the matter to the Wage 
Stabilization Board.42 As these efforts failed and a strike loomed, Truman pondered 
taking control of the steel industry, despite the fact that none of the various statutory 
schemes available to him – including the Taft-Hartley Act,43 the Selective Service Act,44 
and the Defense Production Act45 – expressly afforded him that option.  The day before 
the strike was scheduled to take place, Truman adopted an executive order directing the 
Secretary of Commerce to seize the steel mills in order to avert a production crisis.46  The 
day after, his message to Congress opened the door for legislative authorization without 
exactly inviting it – noting that “sound legislation” regulating the steel seizure’s specifics 
                                                 
41 Compare, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004) (concluding that the 
Authorization to Use Military Force, 115 Stat. 224, which permitted the President to use “all necessary and 
appropriate force” to respond to the attacks of September 11, 2001, also permitted the capture and detention 
of individuals). 
42 Statement by the President on the Labor Dispute in the Steel Industry, 1951 PUB. PAPERS 651 
(Dec. 22, 1951).  The Board eventually submitted recommendations, but these proved unacceptable to 
industry while, at the same time, worrying some Administration officials responsible for stabilizing prices.  
MARCUS, supra note 3, at 59-75. 
43 The Taft-Hartley Act, see Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, ch. 120, §§ 206, 209-10, 
61 Stat. 136, 155-56, permitted the President to respond to certain work shortages by appointing a board of 
inquiry that could order a cooling-off period of limited duration.  It did not refer to seizure as a possibility, 
and because it sought to maintain the status quo did not do well by the steelworkers, with whom the 
Administration was sympathetic.  MARCUS, supra note 3, at 75-76; see also Transcript of Oral Argument at 
7-13, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (No. 744), available at http:// 
steelseizure.stanford.edu/arguments/transcript51252.pdf [hereinafter Youngstown May 13 Tr.] (argument 
of Philip B. Perlman, Solicitor General) (discussing limits to Taft-Hartley). 
44 Section 18 of the Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 625, § 18(d), 62 Stat. 604, 626, did license 
seizure of facilities that failed to fulfill government orders relating to national defense. However, the 
procedure was cumbersome and ill-suited; it assumed that the government was seizing particular 
manufacturers with which it had placed orders, when the government ordinarily participated only indirectly 
in the steel market via the purchase of finished goods containing steel.  MARCUS, supra note 3, at 76-78; 
see Youngstown May 13 Tr., supra note 43, at 15 (colloquy between Justice Jackson and Solicitor General 
Perlman). 
45 The Defense Production Act of 1950, ch. 932, 64 Stat. 798, as amended, not only allowed the 
President to stabilize prices and to mediate labor disputes concerning national defense, see §§ 402(b), 502, 
64 Stat. at 803, 812, but also authorized him to obtain property under certain conditions by instituting 
condemnation proceedings.  Id. § 201(a), 64 Stat. at 799-800; Amendments to Defense Production Act of 
1950, ch. 275, § 102, 65 Stat. 131, 132.  The White House considered these condemnation proceedings to 
be too time-consuming and complex.  MARCUS, supra note 3, at 75; Youngstown May 13 Tr., supra note 
43, at 14-16 (argument of Philip B. Perlman). 
46 Exec. Order No. 10340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (1952). 
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might be “very desirable,” but that immediate action was not “essential,” since he would 
in the interim take responsibility for operating the steel mills.47  
Congress did not, in fact, intercede, and the aggrieved steel companies initiated 
litigation.  The Justice Department initially took President Truman’s go-it-alone rhetoric 
as expressing a constitutional prerogative; their claim in the lower courts that the 
President’s exercise of authority could not be regulated by Congress did not go over well, 
to put it mildly.48  In the Supreme Court, the executive branch shifted to arguing that the 
President had authority in the absence of congressional contraindication – and, still more 
modestly, that the lower courts had erred regarding the injunctive remedy, such that no 
constitutional issues needed to be resolved.49  There was no disagreement, then, that 
Congress had the authority to foreclose the President from seizing the steel mills, but 
rather a threshold controversy as to what Congress had done.50 
                                                 
47 Special Message to the Congress Reporting on the Situation in the Steel Industry (Apr. 9, 1952), 
reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 82-422 (1952), 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 883; MARCUS, supra note 3, at 94-99; see 
also Transcript of Oral Argument at 27-28, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) 
(No. 744) available at http:// steelseizure.stanford.edu/arguments/transcript51252.pdf [hereinafter 
Youngstown May 12 Tr.] (argument of Philip B. Perlman, Solicitor General).  Truman also noted that 
Congress might countermand his seizure, but added that since “that would immediately endanger the safety 
of our fighting forces abroad and weaken the whole structure of our national security,” he did “do not 
believe the Congress will favor” such a course.  Special Message, supra; accord Letter to the President of 
the Senate Concerning Government Operation of the Nation's Steel Mills, reprinted in CONG. REC., Apr. 
21, 1952, at 4192. 
48 See MARCUS, supra note 3, at 105-24 (describing Justice Department arguments in lower courts, 
including the claim that the President’s authority was not limited by the Constitution); id. at 124-29 (noting 
abreaction in the press, Congress, and within the executive branch, and rejection by the district court); see 
also William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 751, 758-62 
(1986) (citing examples of newspaper coverage). 
49 Rehnquist, supra note 48, at 765-66 (noting shift in argument), citing  Brief for Petitioner at 
102-50, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).    It was easier to change the 
lawyers’ script than it was to change the President’s.  See id. at 125-26 (describing purported denunciation 
by President Truman of position espoused by the Justice Department in the district court oral argument, and 
ambiguous response by Truman to public inquiry); id. at 176-77 (noting President Truman’s statement, 
during the Supreme Court deliberations, that “The President has the power [to seize domestic industries in 
time of emergency,” and [Congress and the courts] can’t take it away from him.”). 
50 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING 
AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1011 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1958-1994) (“The 
President and his legal advisers seemed at all times, and in any event at all crucial times, to have conceded 
that Congress had the power to forbid the President to resort to seizure.  Thus, the only question arising 
under the statutes was whether any act of Congress had so forbidden him”) (emphasis in original); accord 
JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 272, 318. 
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Unfortunately for President Truman, even this more modest approach fell flat.51  
Justice Black’s majority opinion, joined by four of his colleagues,52 showed a 
characteristic rigidity.  After rejecting the argument that the injunction against the 
President’s order should have been refused on non-constitutional grounds,53 Justice Black 
stated simply that “[t]he President’s power . . . to issue the order must stem either from an 
act of Congress or from the Constitution itself.”54   As to Congress, Justice Black denied 
that the President had any express authority, and that no statute had been brought to the 
Court’s attention that would imply such authority – “[i]ndeed,” he continued, “we do not 
understand the Government to rely on statutory authorization for this seizure.”55  
Nevertheless, he examined the possibility.  Although the Selective Service Act and the 
Defense Production Act allowed seizure of property under particular circumstances, their 
conditions were admittedly not met; indeed, he continued, Congress had just rejected a 
proposed amendment to the Taft-Hartley Act that would have permitted seizure as a 
means of resolving labor disputes.56  Absent congressional authorization, Justice Black 
contended, the President’s authority had to be rooted in a particular constitutional 
provision, and he made short work of that possibility: Nothing in the Constitution’s text, 
including the Commander in Chief power or the executive power, licensed seizure.57 
All five concurrences are interesting, as is Chief Justice Vinson’s dissent.  But 
time has reckoned Justice Jackson’s opinion the most important – to the point, as noted 
earlier, that it has essentially eclipsed the majority opinion.58  Jackson begins by 
intimating, in an off-putting mix of the personal and Olympian,59 that the proper division 
                                                 
51 William Rehnquist, who was clerking for Justice Jackson at the time, suggested that “I don’t 
think the government’s arguments in the district court could have been erased from anyone’s mind.”  
Rehnquist, supra note 48, at 766.  
52 Justices Burton, Douglas, Frankfurter, and Jackson concurred in Justice Black’s opinion and in 
the judgment, while Justice Clark concurred in the judgment only.  For fuller descriptions of the Supreme 
Court proceedings and the resulting opinions, see, e.g., Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Youngstown 
Revisited, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 373 (2002). 
53 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 584-85. 
54 Id. at 585. 
55 Id. at 585. 
56 Id. at 586. 
57 Id. at 587-89. 
58 See supra text accompanying note 22. 
59 This is admittedly a matter of taste.  Sanford Levinson, Introduction: Why Select a Favorite 
Case?, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1196-97, 1198 (1996) (describing the concurrence as “one of the few 
opinions that make me truly proud to be a constitutional lawyer,” by virtue of the “interplay of persona and 
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of federal authority is a question colored by perspective and experience.  Justice Jackson 
(rather, “anyone who has served as legal adviser to a President in time of transition and 
public anxiety”60) is well situated, we are told, to recognize both the virtues of plenary 
presidential power and its vices.  Jackson advises, half-apologetically, that a period of 
“detached reflection” may have tempered the teachings of that experience, but that he 
himself has not yet substituted “the conventional materials of judicial decision which 
seem unduly to accentuate doctrine and legal fiction”; unlike Justice Black, maybe, he 
has “half overcome” this particular “mental hazard” by recognizing it.   Jackson cautions 
that it is for everyone – not just executive branch officials – to vigilantly avoid the 
common tendency to exaggerate “transient results” over consequences for “the balanced 
power structure of our Republic.”61   
This preface helped defuse the awkwardness of Justice Jackson’s own position in 
Youngstown.  As Attorney General, Jackson had defended a very broad view of the 
President’s seizure power62 – a point stressed enough by government attorneys that 
Jackson, awash in Vinson Court recusal controversies largely of his own making,63 
                                                                                                                                                 
analysis” that is “revealed” or “constructed” by the opinion’s rhetoric); see also Jaffe, supra note 6, at 940 
(praising, effusively, Jackson’s style).   
60 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring).  Among the other justices, Stanley Reed (who 
dissented) had served as Roosevelt’s Solicitor General; Tom Clark had served as Truman’s Attorney 
General.   
61 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
62 Jackson’s opinion alludes, briefly, to the seizure of the North American Aviation Company, a 
precedent heavily relied upon by the government in briefing and at oral argument.  Id. at 649 n.17 (Jackson, 
J., concurring).  His draft opinions distinguished that episode at much greater length, see White, supra note 
30, at 1127-29, and the issue was prominent at oral argument.  Youngstown Tr. May 12, supra note 47, at 
41-42 (Jackson distinguishes prior seizure); id. at 42 (Jackson, following remark by Solicitor General 
Perlman that “Your Honor, we lay a lot of it at your door,” responds that “Perhaps rightly. . . . I claimed 
everything, of course, like every other Attorney General does.  It was a custom that did not leave the 
Department of Justice when I did.”).  Likewise John W. Davis, advocate for the steel companies, had to 
differentiate the more robust view of executive power he had earlier advocated when serving as Solicitor 
General.  Youngstown Tr. May 12, supra note 47, at 15, 19. 
63 First there was a contretemps over Justice Jackson’s withdrawal from a case tried before his 
service as Attorney General, which he did in a way that cast aspersions on Justice Murphy.  John P. Frank, 
Disqualification of Judges: In Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 43, 47-48 (1970).  
Then, while at the Nuremberg Tribunal, Jackson aired objections to Justice Black’s failure to disqualify 
himself – with Jackson telling Congress that he wanted similar practices “stopped.”  Letter of Associate 
Justice Robert H. Jackson to Congressional Judiciary Committee, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1946, at 2; see 
Dennis J. Hutchinson, The Black-Jackson Feud, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 203; GERALD T. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK 
AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 224-49 (1977). 
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considered withdrawing from the case.64  The other function was to challenge the 
sufficiency of mere doctrine.  As Jackson recounted, judicial authority shed little light on 
the proper bounds of executive power under the Constitution; that dearth of authority, he 
notes, was due not only to the enigmatic materials left by the Framers, but also to the 
“judicial practice of dealing with the largest questions in the most narrow way.”65   
Jackson set about addressing the issue in a far less narrow way.  His concurrence 
focused holistically on relations between the political branches – the premise being that 
separated powers were supposed to be smoothed by practice into a workable government, 
and that presidential powers fluctuated depending on whether they were in “disjunction 
or conjunction with those of Congress.”66  The result is the famous three-part framework, 
which Justice Jackson called “a somewhat over-simplified grouping of practical 
situations”: 
    1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it 
includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that 
Congress can delegate.  In these circumstances, and in these 
only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the 
federal sovereignty.  If his act is held unconstitutional under 
these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal 
Government as an undivided whole lacks power.  A seizure 
                                                 
64 White, supra note 30, at 1129-30.  Jackson’s decision to participate was well within prevailing 
standards, even if his rationale – that the case should be heard by judges with executive and legislative 
experience (id. at 1129-30) – was not the strongest.  Jackson would also have been aware that while serving 
as Attorney General in 1949, his colleague Tom Clark had advised that the President had independent 
constitutional authority to seize facilities subject to strike.  As it developed, Clark nonetheless favored the 
steel companies in Youngstown, on the ground that the President had eschewed statutory procedures, but 
apparently told Chief Justice Vinson that he would supply the fifth vote in the event four others supported 
Truman’s order.  WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE BIRTH OF THE MODERN CONSTITUTION: THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT, 1941-1953, at 388, 390 (The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise, History of the Supreme 
Court of the United States, Vol. 12, 2006); ALAN WESTIN, ANATOMY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASE 
190 (rev. ed. 1990).  Clark’s prior advice was well known – he had proffered it in a reply to the chair of the 
Senate Labor Committee, in connection with a proposed repeal of Taft-Hartley – and gave rise to pressure 
on him to withdraw from the case.  Oral History Interview with Tom C. Clark at 219-20 (Washington, Feb. 
8, 1973), on file at the Harry S. Truman Library, available at 
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/oralhist/clarktc.htm.  Jackson’s remarks in his published opinion about the 
valued perspective of those serving “as legal adviser to a President in time of transition and public anxiety” 
were thus well calculated to defend both himself and Clark. 
As if matters weren’t compromised enough, Chief Justice Vinson is alleged to have “privately 
consulted with Truman, recommended the seizure, and assured him of its constitutionality.”  WIECEK, 
supra note 64, at 388 & n.90 (noting, however, challenges to this account). 
65 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634-35 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
66 Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would 
be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest 
latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion 
would rest heavily upon any who might attack it. 
        2. When the President acts in absence of either a 
congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon 
his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in 
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in 
which its distribution is uncertain.  Therefore, congressional 
inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as a 
practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent 
presidential responsibility.  In this area, any actual test of power 
is likely to depend on the imperatives of events and 
contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of 
law. 
        3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the 
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest 
ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional 
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the 
matter.  Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such 
a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the 
subject.  Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and 
preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake 
is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.67 
 
Though he had scarcely finished intimating that different actors had different 
takes on presidential authority, Justice Jackson was surprisingly unspecific about the 
framework’s intended audience.  Jackson may have hoped to fuel the executive branch’s 
self-examination as to when “a President may doubt” a proposed action’s legality;68 that 
would be consistent with his view that judges were ill-situated to address separation of 
powers questions.  But the framework also identified when “others may challenge” 
presidential actions, how courts should proceed, and ultimately the “legal 
consequences.”69  Its utility for courts was confirmed by the case at hand, which Jackson 
described – because it fell within the third category – as “circumstances which leave 
Presidential power most vulnerable to attack and in the least favorable of possible 
                                                 
67 Id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
68 Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
69 Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).  For example, in discussing Category Three, Justice Jackson 
noted that “Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress 
from acting upon the subject.”  Id. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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constitutional postures.”70  In any case, after the President acts, it remains for the 
judiciary to take account of Congress’ posture in evaluating the legality of presidential 
action. 
In the judiciary’s hands, at least, Jackson’s categories serve both a sorting 
function – identifying which category applies to a given case – and a standard-setting 
function, articulating how each set of circumstances should be scrutinized.  Category One 
cases are those in which Congress has authorized the President’s actions; this places 
executive branch authority “at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his 
own right plus all that Congress can delegate.”71  This notion of additive, “maximizable” 
power is unhelpful.  The scope of presidential action being reviewed by the judiciary is, 
by Jackson’s lights, already cast in stone; the question is simply whether that action is 
lawful, so if the President ekes out sufficient authority from Congress (or possesses it “in 
his own right”) his authority is already in every relevant sense “at its maximum.”72  
(Ordinarily, one expects, presidential authority is simultaneously established and 
maximized by virtue of a congressional delegation, but once in a while Congress has 
nothing to add – for example, when it comes to exercising the pardon power.73)  Jackson 
may have meant that the probability of legality is greatest when Congress lends its 
support, because the President can cite both executive and legislative authority in his 
defense and prevail even if partly wrong.74  Arguably that then warrants “the strongest of 
presumptions,” “the widest latitude of judicial interpretation,” and the heaviest “burden 
of persuasion” for those objecting – it is not clear whether Justice Jackson meant 
                                                 
70 Id. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
71 Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
72 Some cases might seem to be more about the extent of a presidential action than about its bare 
lawfulness.  In Crosby, for example, the Supreme Court was concerned solely with whether President’s 
authority had preemptive effect, and it invoked the Youngstown framework and Category One to determine 
that it did.  Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 375 (2000).  But ultimately every 
challenge to executive branch action seeks to disable it only insofar as it has pertinent legal effect, so it is 
hard to see how a continuum is relevant for judicial analysis.  Ex ante, however, the President may face a 
question as to the breadth of a potential program, and so may wish to calculate the sum of authority 
available via Congress and independent executive branch authority.  See infra Part III. 
73 United States v. Klein, 13 Wall. 128, 147 (1872) (Congress may not interfere with a Presidential 
pardon). 
74 Cf. id. at 636-37 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“If his act is held unconstitutional under these 
circumstances, it usually means that the Federal Government as an undivided whole lacks power.”). 
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something different by each of these terms – but the impact, again, should be limited, 
since measures taken under other circumstances have equal potential legality. 
Category Two cases are those in which the President has acted without 
congressional approval or disapproval; in such cases, Jackson states, “he can rely only 
upon his own independent powers.”75  So far, so good.  But what follows confounds 
matters.  The President may not, it turns out, be left entirely to his own devices, because 
there is a “zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or 
in which its distribution is uncertain.”  It is not self-evident whether this twilight zone is a 
discrete subset of Category Two, or whether constitutional uncertainty is so pervasive 
that everything within Category Two falls into this zone.  This subset (if subset it was) 
may or may not be distinct from that in which Congress not only failed to grant or deny 
presidential authority, but also demonstrated “inertia, indifference or quiescence.”76  
Jackson moves from unclear to tentative in sketching the appropriate standard to be 
applied in Category Two.  All that can be said is that congressional inaction “may 
sometimes” (not definitely, or all the time), “at least as a practical matter” (if not 
necessarily in the eyes of the law), “enable, if not invite” (again, perhaps a distinction 
between practical and formal licensing) “measures on independent presidential 
responsibility” (ditto).  Assuming that all gets cleared up, the resulting test of authority is 
“likely to depend on the imperative of events and contemporary imponderables rather 
than on abstract theories of law,” which sounds even more imponderable.  Whether this 
provides an approach to constitutional interpretation in this class of cases or a theory of 
abstention resists definitive conclusion. 
Category Three, involving circumstances in which Congress has disapproved of 
presidential action, is perhaps the most conventional.  Here the President’s benefit of the 
doubt is surely lost, as is any immunity from judicial review.  Rather, the President’s 
                                                 
75 Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
76 Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).  Jackson may also have meant this to be synonymous with 
the threshold conditions of congressional inaction (as suggested by his use of “[t]herefore”), or might 
require a more concerted showing as a threshold to any Category Two treatment.  For example, the Court in 
Medellín v. Texas stated that “[u]nder the Youngstown tripartite framework, congressional acquiescence is 
pertinent when the President's action falls within the second category – that is, when he ‘acts in absence of 
either a congressional grant or denial of authority’," and proceeded to analyze whether there was 
congressional acquiescence on the assumption – contrary to the remainder of its analysis – that the 
“prerequisite” of congressional failure to grant or deny authority had been met.  Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. 
Ct. 1346, 1370 (2008). 
  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF YOUNGSTOWN 19
 
action must be “scrutinized with caution” (meaning, one supposes, searchingly rather 
than reluctantly) for fear of letting the constitutional balance skew toward the executive 
branch.  Precisely how much caution is unclear, not least because it is relative to the 
(unclear) treatment due within the other categories.  As with Category One, Jackson 
employs the rhetoric of arithmetic, here to the effect that the President enjoys “his own 
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.”  But 
this makes more sense in Category Three: One can see how some presidential powers 
may be defeasible, or subject to subtraction, by Congress – though Jackson also 
recognizes that the subtrahend may be zero, if the Presidential power at issue is not one 
Congress may limit.77  
In applying these categories, the primary variable is straightforward: what matters 
is what Congress had done.  Critically, for purposes of sorting, Jackson was preoccupied 
with what Congress had done relative to that particular presidential action.  Each of the 
measures to which he adverted in applying his framework (for purposes of shunting the 
matter from Category Two to Category Three, as we will see) had recently been adopted 
or rejected;78 the prior cases he cited as illustrating each category also dealt with 
congressional action of recent vintage, and of particular relevance to the action under 
review.79  Any longer-term modus vivendi between the President and Congress was more 
relevant, seemingly, to assessing particular claims of authority per the appropriate 
standard after sorting had been performed – as in considering, within Category Three, 
whether political branch practices had so buttressed the President’s Commander in Chief 
authority that a presidential initiative could be sustained.80  It was Justice Frankfurter, 
more than Justice Jackson, whose Youngstown opinion described a method for discerning 
when courts should defer to the political branches’ interpretation of the Constitution.81  
                                                 
77 Id. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
78 Id. at 639 nn.6-8  (Jackson, J., concurring) (citing the Selective Service Act of 1948, the 
Defense Production Act of 1950, and the Labor Management Relations Act – or Taft-Hartley Act – of 
1947). 
79 Id. at 635-38 nn. 2-4 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
80 Id. at 644-45 & nn. 12-14 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
81 Id. at 610-11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“In short, a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, 
long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who 
have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of the structure 
of our government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 of Art. 
II.”); see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) (quoting Justice Frankfurter); Medellin v. 
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II. THE CONCURRENCE AND CONGRESS: THE HIDDEN VIRTUES OF HIDDEN WILL 
Justice Jackson’s concurrence has long been endorsed by skeptics of executive 
power,82 and it is easy to see its appeal.  The entire premise was that the executive branch 
might require policing; his framework was unsuited to any claim that Congress had 
encroached on executive branch prerogatives.83  And despite Justice Jackson’s personal 
history of executive branch service, his sympathies in any clash between the branches 
were apparent.  He discounted claims that judicial intervention would undermine 
executive branch authority, reasoning that the President’s contemporary capabilities 
exceeded anything specified by the Constitution – noting “the gap between the 
President’s paper powers and his real powers,”84 and suggesting that the President’s 
function as a national and party figurehead would maintain or even enhance that gap.85  
Refusing President Truman, consequently, was only to refuse “further to aggrandize the 
presidential office.”86  Conversely, permitting the executive branch to seize (literally) 
authority without congressional approval did not leave him “alarmed that it would plunge 
us straightway into dictatorship, but it is at least a step in that wrong direction.”87   
Still, reexamining the Youngstown opinions, it isn’t obvious why Justice Jackson 
in particular should be considered Congress’ champion.  As previously noted, Jackson’s 
framework preserved the possibility that the President would prevail sometimes even 
when directly gainsaid by Congress,88 and he seemed particularly indulgent toward the 
President’s wartime powers – so long as they were directed outward.89  While Justice 
                                                                                                                                                 
Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1352 (2008) (citing Dames & Moore); see also United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 
236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915) (stating that “long-continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by Congress, 
would raise a presumption that [an executive action] had been [taken] in pursuance of its consent....”); id. at 
472-74 (citing cases).  A similar approach was adopted by Chief Justice Vinson in dissent, but with less 
clearly specified criteria.  See 343 U.S. at 683-700 (reviewing history of presidential powers to address 
emergencies). 
82 See supra text accompanying note 30. 
83 See LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1996). 
84 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 653 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
85 Id. at 653-54 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
86 Id. at 654 (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
87 Id. at 653-54 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
88 See supra text accompanying note 28. 
89 See POWELL, supra note 22, at 130; e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“I should indulge the widest latitude of interpretation to sustain his 
exclusive function to command the instruments of national force, at least when turned against the outside 
world for the security of our society”). 
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Black’s majority opinion lacked Jackson’s rhetorical flourish, his rejection of executive 
power was actually much more sweeping.  Justice Black strongly implied that the 
President’s powers were solely those identified in the constitutional text, whether 
considered singly or in the aggregate, and he viewed those enumerated powers 
narrowly.90  Moreover, Justice Black regarded the seizure order as lawmaking of the kind 
“entrusted . . . to the Congress alone.”91  None of the other opinions, including Justice 
Jackson’s, seemed to take such a categorical view.92  And even if Justice Black’s position 
was regarded as untenable,93 or prone to interfere with congressional authority to 
delegate,94 others concurring in Youngstown – Justices Frankfurter, Burton, Clark, and 
Douglas, to be precise – also went to bat for congressional prerogatives.  
Why then is Justice Jackson considered first among the majority’s equals?  
Certainly because of the quality of his writing and the versatility of his framework, but 
something more specific is also at work: namely, his sensitivity as to how the President 
and Congress actually interact and his expansive understanding of authoritative 
congressional action.  Recall that under Jackson’s framework, for presidential authority 
to be considered at its “maximum,” the President must act “pursuant to an express or 
                                                 
90 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (“It is clear that if the 
President had authority to issue the order he did, it must be found in some provisions of the Constitution.  
And it is not claimed that express constitutional language grants this power to the President.  The 
contention is that presidential power should be implied from the aggregate of his powers under the 
Constitution.”). 
91 Id. at 589. 
92 The closest, in all probability, was Justice Douglas, who – while intimidating less of a textualist 
approach, and saying less about the President’s Article II authorities – did also stress that “the Constitution 
is not ambiguous or qualified,” placing “not some legislative power in the Congress” but rather all of it.  Id. 
at 630; see also id. at 630 (“The legislative nature of the action taken by the President seems to me to be 
clear.”).  Concededly, evidencing this conclusion would require a careful synthesis of each opinion’s 
argument.  For what it is worth, it seems consistent with the conclusions of others.  See, e.g., MARCUS, 
supra note 3, at 215-17 (noting Justice Black’s relatively narrow view of inherent presidential authority); 
Bellia, supra note 27, at 99, 103 (same).  But see Paulsen, supra note 2, at 225 (describing approaches 
taken by Justices Black and Jackson as “perfectly harmonious,” and disagreeing with those suggesting that 
the two opinions are inconsistent). 
93 See, e.g., Kauper, supra note 6, at 180-81 (voicing early criticism of Black’s distinction between 
legislative and executive powers); cf. Corwin, supra note 6, at 64 (voicing early criticism of Black’s 
disregard for constitutional practice). 
94 That is, Justice Black seemed to be suggesting that even were the President otherwise capable of 
arguing that the steel seizure effectuated one of his Article II powers, the kind of action he took could only 
be exercised by Congress; this suggests that Congress could not even assign it to him.   See, e.g., 
Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579, 587-88 (describing limitations that Article I places on presidential authority). 
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implied authorization of Congress.”95  The President’s authority is “at its lowest ebb,” on 
the other hand, if he “takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of 
Congress.”96  Whether a matter falls within Category One or Category Three, and is 
subject to presumptions of legality or illegality, could therefore turn rather on whether 
Congress had implicitly favored or disfavored the action.97   
While one might construe “implied authorization” and “implied will” modestly,98 
Jackson meant something more, so far as can be reconstructed.  At a minimum, 
Congress’ endorsement or negative could be divined from a statute according to a 
standard that was unusually tractable and quite possibly asymmetrical.  Justice Jackson 
and others in the majority pretermitted evaluation of President Truman’s steel seizure by 
asserting that the Truman Administration had “conceded that no congressional 
authorization exist[ed]” for the seizure.99  This was plainly wrong – the government had 
conceded that no explicit (or “specific”) authorization existed, but at the same time had 
invoked implicit authorization from the overall pattern of congressional activity100 – and 
                                                 
95 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). 
96 Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
97 Professor Yoo was mistaken, then, in asserting that “Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence hinged 
the legality of presidential power on explicit congressional authorization.”  JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF 
WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 6 (2005). 
98 Conceivably, the framework simply calls on courts to read what Congress has enacted, and to 
understand both the literal text and its unavoidable implications.  One might, for example, think of 
Category Three as encompassing several means by which Congress can preempt presidential action: by 
doing so expressly, as Congress might expressly preempt state laws via a preemption clause, or by doing so 
implicitly, as Congress might enact a statute conflicted with state law.  Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. 
v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-143 (1963) (describing conflict pre-emption, where "compliance with both 
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility"); see Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt Ass’n, 505 
U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (characterizing this kind of preemption as implied in character). 
99 Id. at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring).  Others shared this view.  E.g., id. at 585 (“[W]e do not 
understand the Government to be rely on statutory authorization for this seizure.”).  Justice Frankfurter, 
however, seems not to have under that illusion, or at least thought that the dissent put it into question.  Id. at 
603 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“It is now claimed that that President has seizure power by virtue of the 
Defense Production Act and its Amendments.”). 
100 See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 148, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 
(1952) (“In the present case . . . there was . . . a clear implication of power to seize the steel companies 
from an array of statutes and treaties which commit the Nation by law to a program of self-preservation 
which could not fail to suffer through a loss of steel production.”).  At oral argument, Solicitor General 
Perlman conceded, in response to a question from Justice Reed as to whether he depended on “any statute 
that gives the President the power to do this specifically,” that “[t]here is no specific authority,” but (in 
response to a prompt from Justice Reed) he added that the Defense Production Act provided authority.  
Justice Black then followed up, seeking a concession that the U.S. position depended solely on the 
President’s constitutional authority.  Perlman did not give in, and repeatedly claimed that Congress had 
provided authority under both the Defense Production Act and the Selective Service Act, conceding only 
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suggested that the executive branch would have to be explicit about invoking implicit 
authorization and assiduous about evidencing it.  On the other hand, in discussing the 
possible application of Category Two, Jackson stated that three statutes permitting 
seizure under other circumstances effectively “covered” the “field” and denied 
presidential authority.101  This evoked a preemption-like analysis in which no conflict 
with an enacted law is required;102 presumably it would also suffice to show that a 
presidential initiative posed an obstacle to accomplishing congressional designs.103   
Furthermore, Justice Jackson’s framework also suggested that congressional will 
could be expressed non-statutorily – again, at least insofar as its negative was involved.  
Assessing Truman’s seizure, Jackson appeared to reason that the absence of 
circumstances qualifying for Category One or Category Two necessarily meant that 
Category Three applied; where “the President cannot claim that [his action was] 
necessitated or invited by failure of Congress to legislate,” he suggested, such an action 
must be incompatible with the implied will of Congress.104  That implied will might be 
                                                                                                                                                 
that “[t]here is no statute that specifically gives” the President the power he exercised relative to the steel 
mills.  Youngstown Tr. May 12 at 33-34 (emphasis added).    
It was thus misleading to treat the government as having conceded that the President lacked 
implicit authorization from Congress, as Justice Jackson’s framework would have required.  And even if 
the argument was unpersuasive, it was hardly unprecedented: the U.S. brief quoted at length from similar 
reasoning that then-Attorney General Jackson had employed on behalf of a prior seizure.  Id. at 148-50 
(“[T]he President has back of him not only each general law enforcement power conferred by the various 
acts of Cognress but the aggregate of all such laws plus that wide discretion as to method vested in him by 
the Constitution for the purpose of executing the laws”) (citing 89 Cong. Rec. 3992); see supra text 
accompanying note 62. 
101 Id. at 639 (Jackson, J., concurring).  The government, again, specifically denied the validity of 
this implication, arguing inter alia that the seizure was actually more consistent with those statutes than the 
contrary.  See Brief for Petition, supra note 49, at 58-60. 
102 See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (preemption may be 
inferred from a “scheme of federal regulation ... so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that 
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it”).   I recognize that the categories of preemption 
analysis are not hermetically sealed, that field preemption may be recharacterized as just another species of 
conflict preemption, and that it may also be express or implied.  See Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade 
Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 n.6 (2000). 
103 See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (inquiring as to whether state law 
“stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of 
Congress”).  Cf. Jack L. Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. L. REV. 175, 207 
(stating that relative to obstacle preemption, with field preemption “the likelihood of reliance . . . on 
nontextual purposes and interests is greater, and because there is no particular federal statute identified to 
preempt state law); accord Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2015 
(2000).  
104 Id. at 639-40 (Jackson, J., concurring).  A President’s potential for claiming that he was merely 
“enabled” by Congress, as opposed to being “necessitated or invited,” was for some reason dropped from 
the broader description.  Compare id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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expressed informally,105 as clarified by passages from the other concurrences to which 
Justice Jackson expressly subscribed.106  Justices Black and Frankfurter, in particular, 
each invoked congressional inaction – namely, the fact that Congress had refused 
amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act that would have clearly given President Truman 
seizure authority.107  If congressional will can be informally expressed, as by refusing to 
take action, it suggests the relevance of acts by a subset of Congress rather than Congress 
as a whole.  Individual legislators, certainly, may rise in sufficient opposition to defeat a 
statutory initiative, and a committee may prevent a bill from making the requisite 
progress.  Presumably other “soft law” measures – like simple resolutions passed by the 
majority of one house only, or concurrent resolutions passed by both houses but not 
presented to the President – would be even better indicia.108 
Attaching legal consequence to non-statutory actions, or even inaction, is in 
tension with constitutional principles requiring that Congress attend to legislative 
formalities.  Professor Tribe, for example, has objected to employing “a constitutional 
default rule regarding the scope of executive power . . . that purports to discern what 
                                                 
105 To be sure, Jackson also thought that the statutes actually adopted by Congress had 
contraindicated the seizure (or at least, that the previously enacted “policies” were “inconsistent” with it.  
Id. at 639 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
106 Id. at 639 n.8 (Jackson, J., concurring) (endorsing the statutory analyses of Justices Black, 
Frankfurter, and Burton). 
107 Id. at 586 (“When the Taft-Hartley Act was under consideration in 1947, Congress rejected an 
amendment which would have authorized such governmental seizures in cases of emergency.  Apparently it 
was thought that the technique of seizure, like that of compulsory arbitration, would interfere with the 
process of collective bargaining”) (citing Congressional Record debates); id. at 602-03 (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (stating that “Congress has expressed its will to withhold this power from the President as 
though it had said so in so many words . . . It would be not merely infelicitous draftsmanship but almost 
offensive gaucherie to write such a restriction upon the President's power in terms into a statute rather than 
to have it authoritatively expounded, as it was, by controlling legislative history”); id. at 657 n.4 (Burton, 
J., concurring) (quoting congressional debate on the original legislation also to the effect that Congress 
wished to withhold seizure authority). 
108 See Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Soft Law: Lessons from Congressional Practice, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 573 (2008) (defending, generally, the potential value of congressional soft-law 
communications, particularly “soft statutes” like simple and concurrent resolutions).  Gersen and Posner 
specifically advocate turning away from legislative inaction in administering the Youngstown framework: 
The soft statute should be the preferred mechanism for articulating 
congressional views . . . . because it is a better indicator of legislative 
views than legislative inaction.  There are dozens of reasons Congress 
fails to act, and negative inferences in the context of Article II powers 
are especially hazardous. 
Id. at 603; see also id. at 603 (criticizing references to “congressional agreement, disapproval, or 
silence” as “unnecessarily crude,” given possibility of disagreement among the houses). 
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Congress meant by what it failed to say”109 – including Justice Jackson and some of his 
Youngstown colleagues among the offenders – because “it is essential that such 
[congressional] approval or disapproval take the form of legislation made through Article 
I’s formal procedures of bicameral voting and presentment to the President.”110  Still, one 
can distinguish Justice Jackson’s inquiry, which sought to establish the appropriate 
degree of judicial scrutiny, from an Article I threshold for determining whether an action 
can have binding legal force for third parties.111  The sounder objection is that Justice 
Jackson took a stricter approach to the President’s powers – insisting, for example, on 
finding non-nebulous grounds for executive branch authority,112 and on enabling the 
public to realize “the extent and limitations of the powers that may be asserted.”113  His 
view of Congress’s implied will contrasts awkwardly, in other words, with the 
admonition that affirming the possession of presidential powers “without statute” yields a 
power that “either has no beginning or it has no end.”114      
Even so, this disparate treatment objection may be rebutted with the aid of a 
political scientist’s basic toolkit.115  We might begin with the ideal case in which 
Congress and the President agree on a legislative proposal and their assent results in a 
statute.  It is possible, of course, that Congress will reject (or simply fail to act upon) a 
legislative proposal favored by the President.  Conversely, the President may demur from 
a bill supported by both houses of Congress by exercising a veto, and will prevail if 
                                                 
109 LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 204 n.8 (3d ed. 2000). 
110 Id. at 205. 
111 Compare id. at 205 n.6, citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983) (categorizing as 
“legislative” an action “that had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of 
persons  . . . outside the Legislative Branch”).   
112 Id. at 646-47 (Jackson, J., concurring); see also id. at 654-55 (denying to the President 
“legislative power”). 
113 Id. at 653 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
114 Id. at 653 (Jackson, J., concurring).  It also existed in some tension with Jackson’s resistance to 
using legislative history, which he felt undermined the exactitude demanded by the Constitution.  Robert H. 
Jackson, Problems of Statutory Interpretation, 8 F.R.D. 121, 125 (1948) (“The Constitution evidently 
intended Congress itself to reduce the conflicting and tentative views of its members to an agreed formula. 
It was expected to speak its will with considerable formality . . .  Its exact language requires Executive 
approval, or enough support to override a veto. How far, then, should this formal text and context be 
qualified or amplified by expressions of one or several Congressmen in reports or debates which did not 
find place in the enactment itself?”); see also infra text accompanying note 267 (noting Jackson’s 
criticisms of legislative history). 
115 Qualifications to this model will be discussed below.  See infra text accompanying notes 135-
136, 153-163. 
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Congress is unable to muster a two-thirds majority in both houses.116  Even so, in all of 
these cases, the basic initiative is a legislative proposal, and the sole question is whether 
it receives the necessary degree of assent from the political branches; if it does not, the 
status quo is maintained.   
This is illustrated by a simple spatial model that depicts choices for a particular 
policy issue along one dimension.  Beginning with Figure 1 below,117 this model 
indicates the status quo ante (SQ); the President’s policy position (P); the policy position 
of a notional median congressional voter (CM), which illustrates the point on the policy 
spectrum at which Congress is indifferent as between two policy alternatives;118 and the 
policy position of a notional congressional “veto pivot” (CV), the notional member 
whose vote is necessary to override a presidential veto.119  As shown in Figure 1, were 
Congress free to make up its own mind, it would elect a policy at CM.  The President 
might sometimes support such an initiative, but for purposes of illustration is assumed to 
prefer a different and more extreme position (P).  Here, should Congress act, the 
President would lack any recourse: any presidential veto could be overridden, because the 
position lies to the left of CV.  Assuming perfect information, the President would 
anticipate this result, and his veto would not be exercised in the first place. 
 
                                                 
116 U.S. Const. art. I, § 7. 
117 The design of Figures 1 and 2 (but not those following) is derived from Terry M. Moe & 
William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 132, 139-41 
(1999). 
118 For a popular and influential explanation of the median voter principle, see generally ANTHONY 
DOWNS, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1957).  This clearly employs the simplifying assumption 
of a unicameral legislature, not unlike the simplifying assumption of a unitary executive branch.  But cf. 
Moe & Howell, supra note 117, at 144-45 (suggesting, nonetheless, ideal types of disaggregated Congress 
and unitary presidency). 
119 That is, if the median congressional voter (CM) occupies a position in which half the members 
sit to the left and half to the right, the veto pivot (CV) occupies a position in which two-thirds sit to the left 
and one-third sit to the right.  This employs the simplifying assumption that the relevant decision juncture 
is a floor vote on the merits of a legislative proposal, but there are of course procedural hurdles that create 
their own pivots.  See, e.g., HOWELL 2003, supra note 32, at 29 (depicting sequence of play involving 
introduction of a bill, filibuster, and other junctures); Gregory J. Wawro & Eric Schickler, Where’s the 
Pivot?  Obstruction and Law-making in the Pre-cloture Senate, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 758 (2004). 
  The points might be arrayed to show greater variety – for example, if one imagines the axis as 
depicting a conservative-to-liberal policy spectrum, a President might sit either to the left or to the right of 
Congress – but is simpler to depict it as unidirectional. 
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Figure 1: Legislative Initiative 
 
 
Problems begin to arise when we relax the assumption that Congress is in the 
driver’s seat.  What if the President initiates policy without waiting for Congress’ 
imprimatur?  The possibility seems substantial; nearly any modern observer would say 
that the President can act more swiftly than Congress, even if they might differ as to 
whether that is desirable.120  Assuming, in any event, that the President does act, 
however, his veto will enforces the possibility of moving to a new status quo.  This is 
illustrated in Figure 2.  If the President elects P, the policy he favors best, Congress 
would nullify it through legislation, because it lies outside the bounds of its preference 
(CM) and outside the bounds established by its veto override (CV).121  However, if the 
President elects a position anywhere between CM and CV (and his incentive will be to 
choose CV, as it is closest to his preference), it is Congress that will be helpless.122   
Critically, this result holds whenever the President has the capacity in a practical sense to 
                                                 
120 See, e.g., KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN 26 (2001); cf. Youngstown, 343 
U.S. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring) (remarking that “congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may 
sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on independent presidential 
responsibility”); THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton) (defending a unitary executive by 
explaining that “[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of 
one man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as 
the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.”). 
121 Again, the assumption is that these interactions would anticipated and avoided.  Empirically, 
Congress very rarely overrides a presidential veto, see, e.g., Moe & Howell, supra note 117, at 142 (citing 
study indicating that approximately seven percent of presidential vetoes are overridden), but that may well 
be because presidents exercise the veto rarely when an override is likely. 
122 For a clear exposition along these lines, see Moe & Howell, supra note 117, at 139-41; see also 
HOWELL 2003, supra note 32; Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 2673, 2677-78 (2005). 
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act unilaterally, regardless of whether he has a valid legal basis for so acting.123  The 
result is deeply unsettling to conventional views of the separation of powers.  Those 
insisting that presidents lack the legal capacity to originate policy, or urging that the 
President’s power of initiative is nonetheless defeasible by Congress,124 must 
nevertheless come to grips with the prospect that Congress cannot staunch the exercise of 
unilateral executive authority.  
 
Figure 2: Presidential Initiative 
 
 
It should be evident, though, that Figure 1 and Figure 2 have ignored the 
judiciary.  Either a statute or the Constitution may explicitly prohibit executive branch 
activities.125  And, though they will undoubtedly accord those activities a margin of error 
(reflecting, for example, justiciability or deference doctrines), courts will sometimes 
                                                 
123 Of course, congressional preferences (CM and CV) might well shift in abreaction to a lawless 
power grab.  Moreover, the President may independent reasons for desiring to avoid lawless behavior, 
whether because he is legally scrupulous or because he fears electoral or other consequences.  Cf. MAYER, 
supra note 120, at 18-20 (citing evidence from presidential remarks, and from members of the Justice 
Department, that the executive branch carefully considers the legal aspects of presidential action, “often 
placing more importance on legal issues than on strategic ones”).  Nevertheless, it is valuable to make the 
(somewhat) artificial assumption that the only constraints on unilateral action in pursuit of a policy 
preference are imposed by other institutions – Congress and, as we shall, the courts.  See HOWELL 2003, 
supra note 32, at 65 (assuming that “[t]he ability of presidents to act unilaterally depends on other 
institutions’ abilities to stop them”). 
124 For an example of the former view, one might cite Justice Black’s opinion in Youngstown 
itself; for an example of the latter, essentially confined to the area of foreign affairs, see POWELL, supra 
note 22, at 139-40.  In Professor Powell’s view, Justice Jackson’s own view – reflected more in his analysis 
of the President’s Commander-in-Chief power than in his framework – was reasonably sympathetic to “a 
presidential-initiative reading of the Constitution of foreign affairs.”  Id. at 130. 
125 These limits may be procedural or substantive in character, but it is easier for now to model 
direct limits, even though the President’s trespasses may be indirect in character – for example, exceeding 
limits to delegated authority. 
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enforce these legal limits.  Figure 3 illustrates two alternative versions of such a limit (J1, 
J2):   
 
Figure 3: Presidential Initiative (with Legal Constraint) 
 
 
Per Figure 3, existing law would in principle constrain the President’s latitude for 
unilateral action so long as it occupied a position to the left of CV (here, J1).126  Justice 
Jackson’s concern, however, would lie with circumstances (J2) that permit a President to 
maintain a unilateral action (at CV) – perhaps despite the fact that the action is illegal in 
some technical sense.127  (Imagine, for example, that the “true” legal limit was arguably 
at J1, but that standing doctrine, or deference to executive branch factfinding, meant that 
it could be enforced only at J2.)  His Youngstown concurrence suggests that such 
scenarios will arise frequently, since Congress will not have acted and the Constitution 
will have imposed no judicially enforceable limits.  The risk that the President would take 
advantage of such a situation would have been obvious to Justice Jackson – the whole 
                                                 
126 J1 would limit unilateral action because it lies between the point at which Congress would 
accept a legislative proposal (CM) and the point at which it would overturn unilateral action (CV), which 
previously established the President’s outer bound.   
A more leftward point would be more complicated.  If J1 lay to the left of SQ, it would render 
illegal the existing state of affairs.  If J1 lay between SQ and SM, the effect would be contingent on the 
nature of the constraint.  Insofar as that J1 represents a statutory limit, Congress would in that situation 
prefer to enact a policy closer to the President’s position, so that existing law represents what is at best a 
temporary constraint.  However, if that J1 were predicated on constitutional limits that the judiciary would 
enforce, then it would establish the outer bound for either unilateral or cooperative undertakings by the 
political branches.  
127 J2 represents a scenario in which existing law would permit the President greater latitude than 
would the pivotal veto player, meaning that Congress’ capacity for overturning the President’s action and 
withstanding his veto would comprise the true bound.  J2 might be located at a more extreme position, to 
the right of P, so that existing law would accommodate even the President’s ideal policy, but in that case 
too the limit becomes what the present Congress would prefer, not what a prior Congress (or the 
Constitution) permitted. 
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impetus for the steel seizure conflict was President Truman’s decision to act unilaterally, 
which then engendered post-hoc questions concerning the constitutional and statutory 
state of affairs.128  Indeed, the Supreme Court might well have supposed that President 
Truman had acted first and considered legality later, an impression reinforced by the 
initial insistence by Administration lawyers that inherent presidential authority afforded 
them precisely that luxury.129     
Justice Jackson’s framework offers a clever solution.  His inquiry into whether a 
presidential measure is “incompatible with the  . . . implied will of Congress”130 asks 
about non-statutory activity, including congressional inaction, which is in turn an inquiry 
into a notional congressional median – the point representing congressional preference.  
His inquiry is not, however, precisely focused on the contemporary congressional median 
voter (CM), but rather attempts what we might depict as a judicial construction of a 
recent median from legislative history (JCM).  As illustrated in Figure 4, Congress’ 
failure to adopt a proposal to grant the President the requisite authority (JCM) may be 
more permissive than the existing median (CM),131 but may operate as a constraint when 
judicial enforcement of existing law (J1) would not132 – if and to the extent this new 
constraint is itself enforced by the judiciary. 
 
                                                 
128 The Court’s perceptions on this score are most directly evidenced in the majority’s statement of 
the facts.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582-83 (1952). 
129 See, e.g., MARCUS, supra note 3, at 111 (describing excessive emphasis on presidential 
authority in district court briefing); id. at 117-22 (describing oral argument before the district court, in 
which counsel for the government maintained that the executive powers of the President were not limited 
by the Constitution); id. at 124-25 (noting characterization of this position by White House staff as the 
“legal blunder of the century”); id. at 127-28 (noting repudiation of government position, characterized as 
relying solely on executive power, in the decision enjoining the seizure); see also Devins & Fisher, supra 
note 12. 
130 343 U.S. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
131 If it is not – and JCM occupied a position lying between SQ and CM – the President would 
prefer to pursue the adoption of legislation than suffer judicial enforcement of the JCM limit, barring 
considerations of the kind introduced in Part III.  
132 If J1 lay to the left of JCM, there would no need to have recourse to the more controversial 
implied forms of lawmaking suggested by the Youngstown framework.  J2 would perform the same 
function relative to JCM, and is eliminated in order to reduce clutter. 
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Figure 4: Presidential Initiative (with Category Three) 
 
 
Thus reimagined, the Youngstown framework reflects an appreciation of the extra-
constitutional authority necessary to counter the President’s own.  By giving legal effect 
to unorthodox forms of congressional action (and inaction), the framework just keeps 
pace with the reality of unorthodox presidential activities.  If judges serve as umpires, as 
it is sometimes asserted, this employs the time-honored principle of making sure that the 
breaks given one side don’t exceed those given the other.133  Perhaps Justice Jackson 
deserves credit not only for a sophisticated understanding of presidential power, but also 
for establishing a bulwark that even contemporary political science has yet to 
appreciate.134   
To be sure, this depiction of congressional and presidential behavior remains 
highly stylized.  If we took its assumptions seriously, we would see very few separation 
of powers controversies at all: the President might act once to initiate unilateral action, 
and in choosing how far to push his policy would anticipate the constraint imposed by 
Congress and the judiciary; if he chose his policy position wisely neither of the other 
branches would need to act at all, and Congress would not attempt action because it 
would be fruitless.135  Everything is more complex, of course, if core assumptions like 
perfect information and low or absent transaction costs interactions are relaxed.  If the 
                                                 
133 Cf. Richard G. Graf, Brandon A. Yabko, & Niels P. Christensen, Gender Effects in the 
Assessment of Technical Fouls Among High School Basketball Officials and Collegiate Proxies, 32 J. 
SPORT BEHAV. 175, 175 (claiming that “the Holy Grail of basketball officiating is ‘consistency’,” and 
citing standard exhorting that “[v]iolations, fouls and no-calls at one end of the floor are consistent with the 
same types of plays being called in the same manner at the other end of the floor”). 
134 But cf. supra note 124 (noting possibility that Justice Jackson’s own view might have been 
more indulgent of presidential authority in the realm of foreign affairs). 
135 Because, for example, the President would be in a position to veto a legislative remedy. 
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President miscalculates because of faulty information, for example, he may establish a 
position that poses no issue because it exploits none of his potential advantage.  
Alternatively, a miscalculation may cause him to overreach so that other institutions are 
called upon to act: conceivably the judiciary will strike down an overreaching act as 
inconsistent with prior law or implied congressional preferences, and Congress might 
override the President’s policy by adopting legislation (and afterward, perhaps, override a 
presidential veto as well).   
These and other assumptions may be defended as necessary for any parsimonious 
model, in part because once they are relaxed the interaction among the branches become 
far too difficult to describe systematically.136  Nevertheless, Part III will explore a slightly 
more realistic view.  In particular, it will relax an additional, critical assumption: the 
premise that the position adopted by the President is exogenous, rather than being 
sensitive to the modified judicial constraint that the courts, following Justice Jackson, 
have adopted.   
 
III. FIGHTING THE FRAMEWORK: DYNAMIC REACTIONS 
Notwithstanding the immanent rationale for his concurring opinion – and, more 
obviously, the repudiation by the Court as a whole of President Truman’s seizure – 
Justice Jackson was not wildly optimistic about the decision’s long-term potential.  Near 
the close of his opinion, he cautioned that “I have no illusion that any decision by this 
Court can keep power in the hands of Congress if it is not wise and timely in meeting its 
problems. A crisis that challenges the President equally, or perhaps primarily, challenges 
Congress.”137  Earlier drafts of his opinion better explained his skepticism.  Congress was 
prone, Jackson warned, to dither and bicker, and if it did power would inevitably flow to 
                                                 
136 See, e.g., HOWELL 2003, supra note 32, at 48-53 (discussing, in abstract fashion, how 
informational and other assumptions might be relaxed, but defending them as essential to the explanatory 
power of the unilateral politics model). 
137 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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the President, “in spite of all the essays this Court can promulgate” – or, as he then put it, 
“whether this Court affirms or not.”138 
At first blush, Justice Jackson’s fatalism appears unwarranted.  It seems possible 
that the Court’s affirmance could affect how Congress behaved – that is, that it might 
actually influence whether Congress was “wise and timely in meeting its problems” by 
assuring its members that legislative restrictions would be enforced.  Equally important, 
the Court’s reasoning (and, conceivably, the mechanics of his own framework) might 
make a difference.  The majority opinion, despite its wooden appearance, arguably had an 
inner rationality: Justice Black’s strict distinction between legislative and executive 
functions might be understand as “alarm-clock formalism,” by which an overly stringent 
rule (like setting the clock earlier than strictly necessary) is selected to prevent future 
courts (like drowsy sleepers) from reacting more indulgently to executive inroads on core 
legislative power.139  The potential influence of Justice Jackson’s approach was more 
obvious: Congressional dithering and bickering might actually count for something, 
insofar as it evidenced informal congressional disapproval and resulted in greater scrutiny 
being applied to the President’s action.  If Justice Jackson failed to see the potential, 
perhaps that is only because he did not realize that his concurrence would eventually 
prevail.  
Might Jackson’s framework encourage Congress to recapture authority, or the 
executive branch to better respect the limits to its own authority?  Possibly, but there is 
cause to be dubious.  Indeed, if we assume with Jackson that Congress is not disposed to 
seize the initiative, his framework might hinder rather than help Congress’ cause. 
 
                                                 
138 See White, supra note 30, at 1122-23.  Jackson’s May 22 draft alluded to the demise of the 
Reichstag, and continued: 
As crisis follows crisis, if Congress allows its attention to be diverted 
by trivia, its leadership of the Nation weakened by absorption in 
sectional tasks, its impact weakened by partisaned division, the weight 
of public opinion will surely shift effective power to a centralized 
Executive in spite of all the essays this Court can promulgate. 
White, supra note 30, at 1123 (quoting 5/22 Draft at 28).  He then edited this to read: “If 
[Congress] does not rise to its occasions, if it is petty, partisan, or indecisive[,] power will gravitate to the 
Executive by force of public opinion whether this Court affirms or not.”  Id. 
139 Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial Power in the State (and Federal) Courts, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 
357, 365 (2000). 
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A. The Strategic Component of Executive Branch Behavior 
While presidential studies amounted for many years to the study of personality, 
the last decade has seen an explosion of more formal empirical and theoretical work 
designed to test rational choice-based hypotheses concerning the presidency and its 
lawmaking functions.140  One of the most canvassed areas concerns the study of 
executive orders.141  Without purporting to restate that entire literature,142 its core 
findings are helpful in evaluating Justice Jackson’s framework. 
It is common ground, to begin with, that presidents are not indifferent as to the 
form in which policy is adopted.  Presidents typically show greater interest than Congress 
in promoting the long-term health of their institution, which may sometimes cause them 
to make short-term sacrifices – including, potentially, by insisting on defending the right 
to proceed unilaterally.143 Nevertheless, their primary objective is to adopt policy, and 
they generally prefer to do so via legislation.144  A statute not only reduces uncertainty as 
to whether Congress will countermand a presidential initiative (though Congress remains 
free to change its mind), but it also helps insulate that initiative against retrenchment by a 
                                                 
140 See supra text accompanying note 32. 
141 Regular contributors include William Howell and co-authors, see HOWELL 2003, supra note 
32; WILLIAM G. HOWELL & JON C. PEVEHOUSE, WHILE DANGERS GATHER: CONGRESSIONAL CHECKS ON 
PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS (2007), Moe & Howell, supra note 117; William G. Howell, Unilateral 
Powers: A Brief Overview, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 417 (2005); William G. Howell & Jon C. 
Pevehouse, Presidents, Congress, and the Use of Force, 59 INT’L ORG. 209 (2005); WILLIAM G. HOWELL 
& DOUGLAS J. KRINER, BENDING SO AS NOT TO BREAK: WHAT THE BUSH PRESIDENCY REVEALS ABOUT 
THE POLITICS OF UNILATERAL ACTION, IN THE POLARIZED PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH (George C. 
Edwards III & Desmond S. King eds., 2007); George Krause and co-authors, see George A. Krause & 
Jeffery E. Cohen, Opportunity, Constraints, and the Development of the Institutional Presidency: The 
Issuance of Executive Orders, 1939-96, 62 J. POL. 88 (2000); George Krause & David B. Cohen, 
Presidential Use of Executive Orders, 1953-1994, 25 AM. POL. Q. 458 (1997); and Kenneth Mayer and co-
authors, see MAYER, supra note 120; Kenneth R. Mayer, Executive Orders and Presidential Power, 61 J. 
POL. 445 (1999); Kenneth R. Mayer & Kevin Price, Unilateral Presidential Powers: Significant Executive 
Orders, 1949-1999, 32 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 367 (2002).   
For other leading works, see PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE AND 
ABUSE OF EXECUTIVE DIRECT ACTION (2002); ADAM L. WARBER, EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND THE MODERN 
PRESIDENCY: LEGISLATING FROM THE OVAL OFFICE (2006); Christopher J. Deering & Forrest Maltzman, 
The Politics of Executive Orders: Legislative Constraints on Presidential Power, 52 POL. RES. Q. 767 
(1999); Bryan W. Marshall, Revisiting the Two Presidencies: The Strategic Use of Executive Orders, 33 
AM. POL. RES. 81 (2005); Richard Pious, Why Do Presidents Fail?, 32 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 724 (2002).  
142  For one literature review, see Miner Peek Marchbanks III, A Transaction Cost Approach to 
Unilateral Presidential Action (Dec., 2005) (PhD. dissertation, Texas A & M). 
143 [Insert reference to Cheney/Addington.]  See generally MAYER, supra note 120, at 29-31 
(employing new institutional economics approach to address the use of unilateral authority to shape 
institutions and strategic contexts). 
144 See WARBER, supra note 141, at 17. 
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future administration.  Permanence, in short, favors the pursuit of legislation, and 
administrative alternatives are second-best.145 
For a first wave of studies, it seemed to follow that presidents resort to executive 
orders primarily when they have no alternative.146  If true, this would imply that the 
Youngstown framework’s Category Two and Category Three are populated with 
instances in which a President has proceeded, nearly involuntarily, because legislative 
support could not be obtained.  On this view, presidents are already so incentivized to 
seek legislative support that little further encouragement may be necessary.   
It turned out that there was surprisingly little empirical support for any such 
demand-centered hypothesis. Rather, studies consistently found that presidents issue 
fewer executive orders when the legislature is dominated by the opposing party,147 even 
though the prospect of legislative opposition should make it more attractive, ceteris 
paribus, for the President to resort to acting unilaterally.148  The most obvious 
                                                 
145 Elaborating a little on the virtues of administrative action, Paul Light’s leading account of 
presidential agendas nevertheless indicated that it was an option pursued only when “the legislative channel 
is foreclosed”: 
[T]he President must decide between legislative and administrate 
action.  If the legislative channel is foreclosed, executive action may be 
the only acceptable alternative.  . . . The President may issue an 
executive order when administrative action is the logical alternative, 
when it is the simplest and most direct route.  He may issue one in 
order to prevent a given program’s being involved in congressional 
controversy.  He may use it when the risk of congressional defeat is too 
great.  Finally, the President may issue an executive order after testing 
the congressional path and finding failure. 
PAUL C. LIGHT, THE PRESIDENT’S AGENDA: DOMESTIC POLICY CHOICE FROM KENNEDY TO 
CLINTON 108 (3rd ed. 1999); id. at 117-19 (describing practice of discounting executive orders relative to 
legislative achievements for reasons of “glamor,” prominence, and permanence). 
146 For examples of this prediction, see HOWELL 2003, supra note 32, at 69-70 (noting “’evasion 
hypothesis’” according to which “presidents should act unilaterally precisely when they cannot get their 
legislative initiatives through Congress,” whereas when they have congressional support they need not even 
act at all) (quoting LISA MARTIN, DEMOCRATIC COMMITMENTS: LEGISLATURES AND INTERNATIONAL 
COOPERATION (1999)); WARBER, supra note 141 (noting that, despite interest in avoiding controversy, “it 
is likely that chief executives will slightly increase the number of policy executive orders during divided 
government,” as a means of “salvage[ing] part of its policy agenda . . . without aggressively overstepping 
Congress’s constitutional authority to make laws”); MAYER, supra note 120, at 91 (citing "expectation 
about executive orders... that presidents will tend to issue more when (a) they lack the strong support in 
Congress, and (b) they experience low levels of popular support"); accord Mayer, supra note 141, at 453.  
147 The test for when government is divided in a bicameral system might vary, but it is generally 
sufficient if at least one house is at variance with the President’s party. 
148 See, e.g., HOWELL 2003, supra note 32, at 85-96 (testing and confirming explanatory power of 
inverse relationship to divided government); MAYER, supra note 120, at 99-101 (noting impact of divided 
government even as to presidents facing both divided and unified governments during their terms); accord 
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explanation is that the same conditions of divided government that constrain the 
possibility of obtaining a statutory fix simultaneously reduce the prospect that a unilateral 
executive policy will survive subsequent legislative scrutiny149 – and presidents plausibly 
prefer to avoid legislative repudiation, both because it is wasted effort and due to concern 
for institutional credibility and prestige.150  The upshot is that executive orders may be 
least useful to the executive branch just when they start to get appealing – namely, under 
conditions of opposition.151  Presidents do, however, tend to pursue executive orders 
more frequently when conditions in Congress suggest that it is fragmented and unlikely 
to offer much opposition.152  The data suggests, in sum, a reaction-oriented calculus 
according to which a President will pursue unilateral action when there is insufficient 
opposition in Congress (because Congress will not gainsay it) but not when it is too 
supportive (because he will then seek legislation instead). 
These analyses are substantial improvements in the folk wisdom of congressional-
executive interactions.  But their predictive capacity still depends on some unlikely 
assumptions, just as in the earlier spatial descriptions.  For example, while presidents 
usually have an information advantage over Congress on matters of substance,153 they do 
not have perfect information about congressional decision points (in Figure 4, represented 
as CM and CV) or even those constraints supplied by the judiciary (J and JCM).154  As 
                                                                                                                                                 
Mayer, supra note 141, at 460-61; WARBER, supra note 141, at 64-65.  But see Mayer & Price, supra note 
141, at 378 (finding no systematic relationship between issuance of significant orders and divided 
government, but finding positive relationship between the number of executive orders and new presidents 
who have shifted party control of the White House and inverse relationship between the number of 
executive orders and presidential approval ratings). 
149 See HOWELL 2003, supra note 32, at 69-75 (incorporating party preferences into unilateral 
politics model). 
150 WARBER, supra note 141, at 64 (claiming that while presidents “want to build a policy record, 
it is also in their best interest to avoid entangling the executive branch in a major separation of powers 
battle with Congress over lawmaking responsibilities”).  
151 See HOWELL 2003, supra note 32, at 70 (“Presidents, ironically, enjoy the broadest discretion 
to act unilaterally precisely when they have the weakest incentives to take advantage of it – during periods 
of unified government.  It is possible, then, that the heightened incentives to act unilaterally are cancelled 
out by the losses in discretion to do so, nullifying any effect divided government might have on presidential 
policy making.”). 
152 See HOWELL 2003, supra note 32, at 64 (hypothesizing that “the more fragmented Congress 
becomes, the more freedom the President has to act unilaterally, and hence, the more significant (i.e., 
policy-oriented) unilateral directives he issues”); id. at 85-96 (finding empirical support). 
153 See infra text accompanying note 161. 
154 But see HOWELL & KRINER, supra note 141, at 99 (“[T]he Bush Administration has proven 
remarkably adept at measuring the level of opposition it faces within Congress and adjusting 
accordingly.”). 
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the revised hypotheses about executive orders suggest, presidents are also not inclined to 
optimize the relative policy position at all costs.  Like Congress, they have transaction 
costs,155 and they may shrink from achieving marginal policy advantage if the tradeoff is 
an increased risk of repudiation and reputational injury; like Congress, they seek public 
approval, which may drive them to avoid confrontations for reasons extrinsic to the 
policy result in a particular controversy (or, for that matter, to use leverage outside the 
model to obtain results within it).156 
The models also have a relatively truncated understanding of the means by which 
the political branches act.  For the President, executive orders may indeed be the next-
best means of creating executive branch policy with legal effect – and it was, after all, an 
executive order that was at issue in Youngstown.  (They also offer academics the 
enormous advantage of publicly-available, reasonably complete data, though judgments 
differ about how to redress the inevitable holes and how to avoid treating trivial and 
significant orders as equivalents.157)  The fact remains, though, that presidents have other 
alternatives, including presidential memoranda, presidential proclamations, national 
security directives, and the like; what these lack in terms of external legal effect may be 
offset in terms of flexibility, secrecy, and relative immunity from legislative and judicial 
review.158   
                                                 
155 For discussion of Congress’ transaction costs, see Moe & Howell, supra note 117, at 146-47. 
156 And, to reiterate, the initial depiction of interests – in which the President’s position (P) lies at 
the extreme position along the axis, presumably correlated with a policy outcome that favors the long-term 
institutional interests of the executive branch – reflects a simplifying assumption, and may in fact be 
subject to change depending on the mechanism employed.  For example, the Obama Administration 
recently decided not to seek new congressional authorization for preventive detention.  According to initial 
reports, the decision was based in part on the premise that the 2001 Authorization to Use Military Force, 
which had been regarded as sufficient for at least some such detentions (see supra), would continue to 
suffice; partly on the risk that Congress would decline to provide new authorization; and partly in 
anticipation that the process of pursuing additional authorization would be politically costly.  But the 
executive branch, and certainly some civil liberty groups, also perceived a risk that Congress might 
inappropriately institutionalize executive branch authority – perhaps even giving the executive branch 
greater power than it sought for itself and its successors.  See Peter Baker, Obama to Use Current Law to 
the Support Detentions, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 2009, at A23; Peter Finn, Administration Won’t Seek New 
Detention Systme, Wash. Post, Sept. 24, 2009. 
157 See Mayer & Price, supra note 141, at 373-75 (describing selection of “significant” orders 
based on criteria of “press attention, congressional notice, scholarly treatment, presidential emphasis, 
litigation, or creation of institutions with substantive policy responsibilities”). 
158 See COOPER, supra (analyzing range of tools for “presidential direct administration”); e.g., id. 
at 104-14 (examining benefits and dangers of presidential memoranda relative to executive orders); id. at 
114-15 (describing “substitution of memoranda for executive orders”); id. at 115-16 (describing recourse to 
“quasi-memoranda”); see also LIGHT, supra note 145, at  116 (noting that “executive action involves far 
  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF YOUNGSTOWN 38
 
Congress also has more than formal statutory mechanisms up its sleeve – even 
putting to one side any additional informal tools, clearly relevant to any litigation, that 
Youngstown may create.  While it is generally difficult for Congress to anticipate and 
avoid future conflicts by adopting effective ex ante controls,159 it can increase the 
political costs of unilateral presidential action by holding hearings, establishing 
commissions, slashing budgets, or unleashing individual members to take its case to the 
public.160  These options have not, it should be stressed, kept pace with those available to 
the executive branch, and that Congress is likelier to lack relevant information, suffer 
from transactions costs, and lack the President’s attention to safeguarding institutional 
power.161  Its deficits may also be particularly acute in foreign affairs – not merely 
because of the President’s advantages in terms of information and speed, which may be 
credited to the constitutional design, but also because individual legislators have a 
diminished stake in actions that bear less directly on their constituents.162  
Most important, while the political science literature has tested various political 
conditions (like divided government) as independent variables, and sometimes even 
introduced judicial intervention as a constraint, it has failed to appreciate the significance 
of variance in the background law – particularly the Youngstown framework.  Several 
studies cite Youngstown not only as a data point about the success of executive orders, 
but also as an instructive and influential case for American courts.163  At the same time, 
                                                                                                                                                 
more than the issuance of executive orders,” and noting alternatives); accord at 108; Howell, supra note 
141, at 417 (noting alternatives of executive orders, executive agreements, proclamations, national security 
directives, or memoranda, and assuming that each “assume the weight of law without the formal 
endorsement of a sitting Congress”); STEVEN A. SHULL, POLICY BY OTHER MEANS: ALTERNATIVE 
ADOPTION BY PRESIDENTS (2006) (exploring, in addition to executive orders, presidential budgeting, 
executive agreements, and commitment of troops). 
159 See Moe & Howell, supra note 117, at 140, 141-43 (noting incentive of Congress to delegate 
broadly on some occasions, and its difficulty on other occasions in enforcing narrow delegations).  For a 
more descriptive analysis of the limits of substantive legislation in checking presidential authority, see 
JAMES M. LINDSAY, CONGRESS AND THE POLITICS OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 88-97 (1994). 
160 See, e.g., HOWELL & KRINER, supra note 141, at 99 (suggesting that some of these tools have 
proven successful, including against Bush Administration initiatives).  
161 See HOWELL 2003, supra note 32, at 102-108, 110-12. 
162 See HOWELL 2003, supra note 32, at 108-10; see also CECIL V. CRABB, JR., ET AL., CONGRESS 
AND THE FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS (2000); BARBARA HINCKLEY, LESS THAN MEETS THE EYE: FOREIGN 
POLICY MAKING AND THE MYTH OF THE ASSERTIVE CONGRESS (1994); KOH, supra note 30, at 123-33; 
STEPHEN R. WEISSMAN, A CULTURE OF DEFERENCE: CONGRESS’S FAILURE OF LEADERSHIP IN FOREIGN 
POLICY 12-25 (1995).  For a partial dissent on the strength of the electoral (dis)incentive, see LINDSAY, 
supra note 159, at 33-52. 
163 See, e.g., HOWELL 2003, supra note 32, at 149; WARBER, supra note 141, at 21. 
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much like Justice Jackson, they fail to analyze the ex ante effects of the Youngstown 
framework for executive branch and congressional strategies.  Diametrically opposite 
reactions might be imagined.  Category One might encourage presidents to seek 
legislation, since achieving legislation (or informal support) bolsters a presidential 
initiative’s immunity from judicial review; one can easily imagine Justice Jackson 
thinking along these lines, even if it may have seemed to him too good to be true, and we 
should not lose sight of this salutary prospect.  At the same time, if fear of repudiation is 
indeed significant in deterring presidents from issuing executive orders, Category Three 
enhances that risk by expanding the circumstances under which rejection by Congress 
will effectively serve as a constraint on unilateral presidential action. 
We can model these potential effects.  Recall that (per Figure 4), the Youngstown 
framework supposed that courts might, by reckoning a legislative preference based on 
legislative history, construct an additional constraint on executive unilateralism (JCM).  
The literature on executive orders, and the executive branch’s sensitivity toward 
congressional repudiation, suggests that this might be effective; the same risk-averse 
approach would presumably apply to the prospect of indirect legislative repudiation via 
judicial enforcement of Category Three, such that the executive branch would be 
disposed to establish policy within the constraint established by JCM.   
But presidents, again, have more tools at their disposal than legislative initiatives 
or executive orders.  Once the Youngstown framework has been internalized, presidents 
have an incentive to avoid building cases against themselves – to eliminate, recalling 
Figure 4, the constraint imposed by JCM.  While Category One may provide an incentive 
to establish favorable legislative history, as noted above, this assumes that JCM will be 
more permissive than CM (the point at which a contemporary legislature would support a 
statutory alternative) and, necessarily, not exceed CV (the point at which a contemporary 
legislature could sustain legislative repudiation of the President, and moot judicial review 
on any basis).  It is not difficult to imagine that presidents could maintain control of the 
policy agenda through cooperative and unilateral measures – or, more negatively, 
“manipulate legislative behavior to their own advantage”164 – and so optimize the 
                                                 
164 Moe & Howell, supra note 117, at 145-46 (citing “textbook” analyses of presidential capacity 
to set legislative agenda, in addition to unilateral capabilities). 
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likelihood of a pro-presidential result.  The fixed and exogenous character of any judicial 
restraint is also open to question.  If, for example, a non-framework court might have 
constrained unilateral presidential action by holding that it encroached on Article I, the 
Youngstown framework might counsel in favor of upholding the action based on implicit 
congressional support – if implicit authorization lay outside the limit established by other 
judicial constraints.  This suggests, in short, continued and perhaps even reinforced 
benefits to presidential unilateralism.   
These tentative intuitions are amalgamated in Figure 5.  As it reflects, a strategic 
President might undermine the creation of constraining legislative history (JCM1) – 
allowing the attainable policy position, illustrated as a dashed line, to creep rightward.  A 
sufficiently adept President might even establish a favorable legislative history (JCM2) 
that would defeat the judicial constraint (J) – not incorporating Category Three – that was 
initially illustrated in Figure 3.  The effect, all told, might be to revert to the minimal 
constraint – the veto pivot (CV) – that was evident in Figure 2, and which originally 
illustrated the advantages of unilateral action. 
 
Figure 5: Presidential Initiative (and Strategy) 
 
 
It is impossible to test these intuitions formally.  Presidential initiatives other than 
executive orders are not compiled in any reliable way.  And even if judicial outcomes 
may otherwise be studied and predicted, it would be exceedingly difficult to distinguish 
between preordained judicial constraints (J) and those imposed under the Youngstown 
framework (JCM1 or JCM2).  Finally, in the absence of comprehensive information 
about presidential motivations, the influence of framework-anticipation cannot be 
evaluated systematically. 
   SQ  CM    CV  P  JCM1     J  JCM2 
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The better approach, for now, is to examine historical cases and, to the extent 
possible, develop plausible but non-comprehensive accounts of presidential behavior.  
There is certainly abundant room for strategic refinement.  Based on the work to date, we 
can be reasonably confident that presidents will be tempted to use unilateral powers to 
avoid status quo policies as to which Congress is gridlocked.165  Beyond that, it is useful 
to distill from the case studies some very tentative hypotheses about the dynamic 
strategies employed by the President and Congress in a world where Youngstown has 
been internalized. 
B. Dynamic Effects on Executive Branch Behavior 
It is probably unsurprising that the widest range of adaptive behaviors may be 
envisioned for the executive branch.  After describing, based on anecdotal evidence, three 
hypotheses about presidential strategies, we will then return to a summary case study that 
allows us to witness all three being exhibited at once.  
1. Avoiding Category Three: don’t ask, won’t tell.  Just as trial attorneys are 
cautioned not to ask questions of witnesses when they don’t know the answer, presidents 
may be schooled to avoid asking Congress for powers that may be denied them.  The war 
power setting undergirding Youngstown is familiar in this regard.  In the case at hand, 
President Truman’s decision to use force without prior congressional authorization was 
probably not due to concerns that Congress would have denied permission outright.166  
(That is not to say, necessarily, that he was foolish to refrain from taking that risk.167)  
                                                 
165 See HOWELL 2003, supra note 32, at 53-54 (describing, in general terms, two scenarios in 
which the recourse to unilateral powers will likely be appealing).  Howell also predicts that a President may 
use unilateral action in narrower circumstances, to offer a more modest concession that serves to defeat 
more sweeping congressional initiatives. 
166 His concern was rather that Congress would permit, but at a price.  See supra text 
accompanying note 38. 
167 Thus, President Eisenhower’s criticism of President Truman’s failure to secure congressional 
support seems to have supposed that Truman’s choice was simply between going to war alone or going 
with congressional support, as though the latter was a foregone conclusion.  See 1957 PUB. PAPERS 11, 
quoted in LOUIS FISHER, HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE WAR POWERS AND THE USE OF FORCE, IN THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER TO GO TO WAR: HISTORICAL AND CURRENT PERSPECTIVES 22 (Gary M. 
Stern & Morton H. Halperin eds., 1994) (quoting Dwight D. Eisenhower: “I deem it necessary to seek the 
cooperation of the Congress.  Only with that cooperation can we give the reassurance needed to deter 
aggression.”).  Likewise, after President Clinton sent U.S. troops to Haiti, both the House and the Senate 
passed resolutions indicating that “the President should have sought and welcomed Congressional approval 
before deploying United States forces to Haiti.”  140 CONG. REC. 28239 (1994) (S.J. Res. 229); id. at 
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More generally, though, presidents probably do weigh carefully the risk of rejection when 
deciding whether to seek legislative approval or instead to risk resting more heavily on 
independent constitutional authority.168  A decision to avoid Congress may be indicated 
by any of a number of factors – time pressure,169 a desire not to share credit,170 
confidence that public support will be sufficient to prevent (or overwhelm) any 
subsequent congressional backlash,171 or perhaps a genuine disagreement about legal 
authority172 – but the risk of disapproval is almost certainly a consideration.  President 
                                                                                                                                                 
28565-78 (H.J. Res. 416); id. at 29223-24 (noting House assent to S.J. Res. 229).  Of course the President 
might have welcomed congressional approval and, were it stipulated beforehand that it would be 
forthcoming, he might well have agreed that it should be sought – at least, insofar as it did not estop him 
from arguing on some future, more difficult occasion that permission was unnecessary. 
168 Cf. JAMES M. LINDSAY & RANDALL B. RIPLEY, HOW CONGRESS INFLUENCES FOREIGN AND 
DEFENSE POLICY, IN CONGRESS RESURGENT: FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICY ON CAPITOL HILL 22-28 
(Randall B. Ripley & James M. Lindsay eds., 1993) (noting congressional influence on executive branch 
foreign and defense policy both through substantive legislation and “anticipated reactions”). 
169 This is the functional basis for construing the right of the Commander-in-Chief authority to 
“repel sudden attacks” – whatever the precise scope of that authority may be.  JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND 
RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH 6-7 (1993). 
170 Jide Nzelibe, who argues in favor of this proposition and the converse, risk-spreading 
hypothesis, also cautions against the simple intuition that a President will “seek congressional approval for 
all uses of force,” noting among other things the risk of disapproval: 
A president who seeks legislative consent before going to war may face 
other significant risks such as the legislative imposition of burdensome 
substantive and procedural restraints on how the actual war is 
conducted, premature disclosure of secret or confidential military plans 
by members of Congress, and the possibility of outright rejection of his 
request by Congress.  
Jide Nzelibe, A Positive Theory of the War-Powers Constitution, 91 IOWA L. REV. 993, 1013 
(2006). 
171 This might explain President Bush’s decision to proceed with virtually no advance notice – and 
afterward almost no congressional abreaction – in the case of military action in Panama.  Eileen Burgin, 
Congress, the War Powers Resolution, and the Invasion of Panama, 25 POLITY 217, 234-41 (1992).  Later, 
in the case of the first Gulf War, public support made taking the case to Congress relatively risk-free – in 
the sense that Congress was almost certain to support intervention, but also because President Bush was 
confident that the public would support him even if Congress did not.  Bert A. Rockman, Reinventing What 
for Whom?  President and Congress in the Making of Foreign Policy, 30 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 133, 149 
(2000) (noting that “George Bush said he would have gone ahead with military force in the Persian Gulf 
regardless of what Congress chose to do.”).  President Clinton, on the other hand, promised to give 
Congress a chance to be heard before sending U.S. troops to Bosnia, notwithstanding concrete indications 
that the answer might be negative.  Jim Mann, Clinton Now Faces Congress on Deployment, L.A. TIMES, 
Nov. 22, 1995, at A1.  The amount of political capital, in all events, seems to make a difference.  See 
generally Jim Hoagland, Don’t Do It, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 15, 1994, at A17. 
172 In the context of the Haitian deployment, President Clinton represented that “Like my 
predecessors of both parties, I have not agreed that I was constitutionally mandated to get [congressional 
authorization.”  2 PUB. PAPERS 1994 (1995) (statement at Aug. 3, 1994, press conference). 
  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF YOUNGSTOWN 43
 
Clinton’s decision to deploy troops into Haiti without congressional authorization seems 
to be a ready illustration.173 
The exercise of war powers is a prominent example, but not singular.  The steel 
seizure illustrated the predicament in a slightly more universal context.  As the strike 
drama unfolded, President Truman might have pursued congressional authorization to 
seize the steel mills – even prior to Youngstown, it was apparent that doing so would 
strengthen his political and legal position.  But he appears to have rejected that option not 
only because the timing was inconvenient, but also because his staff estimated that the 
likelihood that Congress would in fact grant him seizure authority was remote.174  
Subsequently, Truman’s strategy of inviting congressional participation, while carefully 
avoiding proposing anything in particular, suggested a strategy brilliantly tailored to the 
framework Justice Jackson had not yet announced.175 
To the extent these political calculations are already well motivated, they may be 
only marginally affected by operation of Youngstown’s rule.  Nevertheless, the Court’s 
decision put the cost of a failed calculation, and the difficulty of making an appropriate 
assessment, in especially stark relief.  As previously noted, Justice Jackson and several of 
his peers emphasized that Congress had at one critical juncture refused to amend the Taft-
Hartley Act to provide specific authority for seizure.176  The Justice Department took a 
different view, citing legislative history indicating that Congress wished only to avoid 
making such “a remedy . . . available as a routine remedy” for fear that doing so would 
frequently give one side an incentive to defeat collective bargaining.177  The Court’s 
                                                 
173 Many have speculated that he proceeded that way because Congress would have rebuffed him.  
See, e.g., Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Constitutional Responsibility of Congress for Military Engagements, 
89 AM. J. INT’L L. 58, 59 (1995); Michael Kramer, The Carter Connection, TIME, Oct. 3, 1994, at 30. 
174 See MARCUS, supra note 3, at 78. 
175 See, e.g., 98 CONG. REC. 4192 (1952) (reprinting message from President Truman) (“[I]f the 
Congress wished to take action, I would be glad to cooperate in developing any legislative proposals the 
Congress might wish to consider . . . I do not believe the Congress can meet its responsibilities simply by 
following a course of negation. . .  . The Congress may have a different judgment.  If it does, however, the 
Congress should do more than simply tell me what I should not do.  The Congress should pass affirmative 
legislation . . .”), cited in Brief for Petitioner at 19-20, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579 (1952). 
176 See supra text accompanying notes 43, 56, 107. 
177 Brief for Petitioner at 170-71, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) 
(quoting 93 CONG. REC. 3835-3836).   In his memoirs, President Truman maintained that he had faced the 
choice as to which of two procedures to use during the period leading up to the seizure – either the Taft-
Hartley Act, which “had been designed primarily for peacetime labor problems,” or the Wage Stabilization 
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contrary conclusion indicated not only that executive branch officials should be prepared 
for more negative glosses on their interactions with Congress, but also that any ex ante 
consideration of going to Congress should be balanced with the risk that any failure could 
have negative repercussions in subsequent litigation. 
While this point was clear enough from any of the concurring opinions, the 
Youngstown framework makes the argument for caution considerably starker.  Trying to 
receive authorization, but failing, may literally be of categorical significance, in that an 
executive action that might otherwise have been considered to fall within Category One 
or Category Two might suddenly be considered to fall within Category Three.  The risk-
averse President may as a result be deterred from seeking permission in the first place.  
One may formulate this prospect in the following form:   
 
Hypothesis 1: A President’s reluctance to risk Category Three, and review at the 
“lowest ebb,” will tend to discourage seeking congressional authorization at all. 
 
To reiterate, there are preexisting bases for such reluctance having nothing to with 
the Youngstown framework.  There are also extrinsic limits on presidential avoidance: To 
put it mildly, the executive branch will not desire to go it alone each and every time it 
risks failure, but instead will choose the occasions for independence with caution and, 
presumably, reluctance.  The point, rather, is that the Youngstown framework reinforces 
the same incentives for unlawful presidential initiatives to which the framework arguably 
reacts.  President Truman, on this view, might never have pursued amendments to Taft-
Hartley in the first place – at least, had he anticipated their potential relevance to the 
Korean conflict or some like occasion – and would thus have accomplished a categorical 
shift in how the Court perceived his case.  
2. Inhabiting Categories One and Two: ask quietly, if you must.  The desirability 
of avoiding Category Three is probably obvious.  But the other elements of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Board licensed by the Defense Production Act – and that Congress had understood these two as alternative, 
not cumulative, tracks.  2 HARRY TRUMAN, MEMOIRS: YEARS OF TRIAL AND HOPE 467 (1956).  By 
extension, it might also have been argued, the limitations that Congress placed on the President’s Taft-
Hartley authority were independent of any other means, statutory or constitutional, that would otherwise be 
available to him. 
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framework seem, at least superficially, to make up for any adverse effect: while the 
executive branch may be motivated to avoid Category Three, it might be motivated in 
equal measure to seek out congressional authorization by the enticements of Category 
One.  By analogy, focusing on a would-be wooer’s fear of rejection while ignoring the 
concomitant upsides would get the analysis less than half right.  
Yet Category One (and, in some circumstances, Category Two) pose similar, if 
less obvious, problems.  The key in both instances is Jackson’s solicitude for implied 
congressional action.  His indulgence of implied authorization in Category One may be 
rationalized as a necessary complement to implied congressional contraindication in 
Category Three.  If one takes seriously the claim that Congress cannot adequately react to 
exigent circumstances, including those in which the President may be inclined to act 
impulsively, it becomes important to show solicitude for all its implied preferences.  But 
this complicates the modern case, sketched earlier, for enhancing Congress’ prophylactic 
authority.  Just as Congress cannot anticipate and foreclose presidential authority of every 
stripe – arguably warranting inferences about what would have displeased Congress – it 
also cannot anticipate all the circumstances under which it would like to consent to 
presidential power.  Authorization, on this view, might also be more easily inferred. 
The problems this creates were evident in Dames & Moore v. Regan.178  Though 
Dames & Moore was the first real use by the Supreme Court of the Youngstown 
framework – Justice Rehnquist stated, half-apologetically, that its use seemed to be 
stipulated by the parties179 – the Court also announced, in the same breath, that more 
nuanced categories might be necessary.180  Evaluating the President’s power to suspend 
claims pending in American courts, the Court acknowledged that nothing gave the 
                                                 
178 453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
179 Id. at 661 (reporting that “both parties agree [that Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in 
Youngstown] brings together as much combination of analysis and common sense as there is in this area”). 
180 As he explained: 
[I]t is doubtless the case that executive action in any particular instance 
falls, not neatly in one of three pigeonholes, but rather at some point 
along a spectrum running from explicit congressional authorization to 
explicit congressional prohibition. This is particularly true as respects 
cases such as the one before us, involving responses to international 
crises the nature of which Congress can hardly have been expected to 
anticipate in any detail. 
453 U.S. at 669. 
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President “specific” statutory authorization, but added that this did not mean that existing 
statutes were “entirely irrelevant to the question of the validity of the President's action,” 
since they were “highly relevant in the looser sense of indicating congressional 
acceptance of a broad scope for executive action.”181  As the Court elaborated,  
Although we have declined to conclude that the [International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act] or the Hostage Act directly 
authorizes the President’s suspension of claims for the reasons 
noted, we cannot ignore the general tenor of Congress' 
legislation in this area in trying to determine whether the 
President is acting alone or at least with the acceptance of 
Congress.   . . . Congress cannot anticipate and legislate with 
regard to every possible action the President may find it 
necessary to take or every possible situation in which he might 
act.   Such failure of Congress specifically to delegate authority 
does not, “especially ... in the areas of foreign policy and 
national security,” imply “congressional disapproval” of action 
taken by the Executive.  On the contrary, the enactment of 
legislation closely related to the question of the President's 
authority in a particular case which evinces legislative intent to 
accord the President broad discretion may be considered to 
“invite” “measures on independent presidential responsibility” 
[citing the Youngstown framework].   At least this is so where 
there is no contrary indication of legislative intent and when, as 
here, there is a history of congressional acquiescence in conduct 
of the sort engaged in by the President.182 
 
The Dames & Moore Court’s principal concern, probably, was to reject the kind 
of Category Three inference of a congressional negative that Justice Jackson himself 
indulged in Youngstown.  Once that was accomplished, implied authorization – rather 
than a rejection of the Youngstown framework – was fairly easily surmised.  It is only in 
the final passages that the Court tips its hand toward Category Two (more particularly, 
that subset in which acquiescence “may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, 
if not invite, measures on independent presidential responsibility”183) as opposed to 
Category One (that is, a claim that Congress had imparted implied authorization through 
the general tenor of its legislation).  In either case, according to the Court, Congress had 
                                                 
181 Id. at 677. 
182 Id. at 678-79. 
183 See supra notes 67-76. 
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done enough to signal authority to immunize the presidential action from judicial 
interference.   
As previously noted, privileging implied authorization is not inherently hostile to 
Congress.  Congressional delegation arguably facilitates a congressional preference to 
vest power in the executive branch.  If Congress later decides otherwise, it can (in theory) 
always recover that authority.  Arguably, even a congressional capacity to vest 
unrecoverable power would be an expression of its preferences.184  The only problem, 
from this perspective, is that Dames & Moore deemed Congress to have conferred 
authority under circumstances in which the implication of authority was particularly 
faint.185   
But more systemic difficulties are also apparent.  As others have noted, Dames & 
Moore encourages the President to act aggressively and to search for authorization 
later,186 aware that in practice it will be difficult for Congress to adopt policies reversing 
course.187  This problem preceded Youngstown and, apparently, survives it as well.  The 
conventional wisdom that Dames & Moore misunderstood or somehow “inverted” the 
Youngstown framework, however, is mistaken;188 at most, the end result is different 
insofar as it is permissive rather than prohibitive.  The source of the problem, moreover, 
can be traced more precisely to the relative standing of implicit legislative behavior 
within each category.  By equating implied and explicit authorization (to the extent that 
either may lodge review of a challenged presidential action in the airy reaches of 
                                                 
184 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1721 (2002). 
185 For an argument that Youngstown and Dames & Moore erred equally, and that neither 
exemplifies the proper inquiry into congressional silence, see Matthew Baker, The Sound of Congressional 
Silence: Judicial Distortion of the Legislative Executive Balance of Power, 2009 BYU L. REV. 225 (2009). 
186 KOH, supra note 30, at 140 (“Dames & Moore sent the president the wrong message.  In 
responding to perceived national crises, the Court suggested, the president should act first, then search for 
preexisting blank checks, rather than seek specific prior or immediate subsequent legislative approval of 
controversial decisions.  Thus, Dames & Moore championed unguided executive activism and 
congressional acquiescence in foreign affairs over the constitutional principle of balanced institutional 
participation”). 
187 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., and John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. 
L.J. 523, 554-56 (1992) (applying this reasoning to Dames & Moore). 
188 KOH, supra note 30, at 140 (suggesting that Dames & Moore “inverted the Steel Seizure 
holding” by finding approval in congressional inactivity); e.g., Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in 
an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 191-92 (1994) (noting with approval criticisms 
that “the results in Youngstown and Dames & Moore cannot easily be squared,” and arguing that “Dames & 
Moore is best read as implicitly applying Chief Justice Vinson's dissenting approach from Youngstown”). 
  THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF YOUNGSTOWN 48
 
Category One, or secure approval under Category Two), the Youngstown framework 
diminishes the President’s incentive to seek explicit authorization.  To cast the 
proposition in more general terms: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The possibility that implied authorization may suffice to achieve 
Category One or Category Two status diminishes the President’s incentive to seek 
explicit authorization.  
 
As with the question of whether congressional authorization should be sought at 
all, the costs and benefits to the executive branch of seeking implied authorization depend 
on particular circumstances and, in large part, transcend Youngstown.  Seeking explicit 
authorization is almost certainly more burdensome.  On the other hand, implied authority 
is far less dependable in character.  The key is recognizing that trying to achieve explicit 
license – and failing – may be even more costly, and that kind of failure is likely to be 
more conspicuous.  Put simply, if either formal or informal authorization would suffice to 
secure nominally equivalent status within Category One or Two, and the failure to secure 
formal authorization is particularly likely to result in Category Three classification, the 
case for settling for implied authorization may be compelling.   
 
* * * 
Both of the hypotheses tendered to this point assume the significance of being 
placed in one category or another, and – whether or not Justice Jackson intended this 
result189 – there is every indication this is substantial.  Should presidential action be 
deemed to fall within Category One, it verges on immunity from judicial challenge, and 
nearly the same may thing may be said for any action falling within the acquiescence 
subclass of Category Two – with quite the opposite effect for Category Three, which is 
practically a death knell for executive branch action.  There have been about 60 reported 
cases addressing the legitimacy of executive branch action under the Youngstown 
framework.  Not a single one of those cases concluded that an action fell within Category 
                                                 
189 Stephen I. Vladeck, Foreign Affairs Originalism in Youngstown’s Shadow, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 
(forthcoming 2009) (“Jackson’s opinion . . . solves practically nothing.  Even under Jackson’s trifurcation, 
the president can lose in category one, he can win in category three, and one is left to wonder just what 
category two means by ‘contemporary imponderables.’”). 
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One but was nonetheless unconstitutional; indeed, no cases even suggested that such an 
outcome was possible.  Nor did any case conclude that an action fell within Category 
Three but could still be upheld.190  The precondition, certainly, is invocation of the 
Youngstown framework in the first instance, and it is undoubtedly the case that some 
controversies that might be resolved under that framework are not – perhaps skewing the 
statistics considerably.191  Still, under the Youngstown framework, implicit congressional 
judgments are in effect determining the very availability and character of judicial review. 
3. Coping with Category Three: when in doubt, interpret it out.  Fortunately, the 
executive branch is not solely in charge of determining when Congress will legislate, or 
whether its intervention will be explicit or implicit in character.  The presidency, 
moreover, changes hands every so often, so a prior inhabitant may make strategic 
concessions that risk haunting the successor in office.  As a result, the executive branch 
will face statutes that attempt to limit presidential authority and, consequently, seem to 
dictate the application of Category Three. 
It turns out, however, that the full-throated application of Category Three is not 
inevitable.  At least where a statute arguably overreaches congressional authority or 
encroaches on executive branch authority, the President may attempt to inhibit its reach 
through various interpretive devices.  The most conspicuous and most controversial is the 
use of signing statements, particularly those interpreting a statute based on the President’s 
                                                 
190 Indeed, I have been unable to find any instance in which a party to a lawsuit devotes serious 
attention to advancing the claim that, should the action be classified as Category One or Category Three – 
whichever classification least serves its interests – the same desired result obtains.  See also Robert Bloom 
& William J. Dunn, The Constitutional Infirmity of Warrantless NSA Surveillance: The Abuse of 
Presidential Power and the Injury to the Fourth Amendment, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 147, 184 
(2006) (describing the Youngstown categories as “largely outcome determinative once a presidential action 
is assigned”). 
191 There are certainly instances, for example, in which executive branch enforcement of a statute 
violating the First Amendment has been struck down as unconstitutional, even though such a case might be 
deemed to fall within Category One and among those cases in which “the Federal Government as an 
undivided whole lacks power” (343 U.S. at 635) – presumably because it is not deemed to involve the kind 
of separation of powers conflict evident in Youngstown.  See, e.g., Kindhearts for Charitable Humanitarian 
Development, Inc. v. Geithner, 2009 WL 2514057 at *15 (N.D. Ohio 2009).  But cf. Ashcroft v. American 
Civil Liberties Union, 535 U.S. 564, 592 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) (stating, in 
reference to a federal statute adopted following a holding that its predecessor violated the First 
Amendment, “Congress and the President were aware of our decision, and we should assume that in 
seeking to comply with it they have given careful consideration to the constitutionality of the new 
enactment. For these reasons . . . the Judiciary must proceed with caution and identify overbreadth with 
care before invalidating the Act”). 
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perception of the Constitution.192  The President may accomplish much the same thing by 
adopting such an interpretation sub silentio or in memoranda or briefs.193 
These longstanding techniques have naturally adapted to Justice Jackson’s 
framework.  The war powers context is in some respects the best possible post-
Youngstown setting for the executive branch.  The President’s Commander-in-Chief 
authority, whether plenary or not, is generally thought to co-vary with the anticipated 
difficulty of congressional intervention, which means that “measures on independent 
presidential responsibility” (and Category Two) may routinely be claimed.194  And while 
Congress has attempted programmatic regulation via the War Powers Resolution 
(WPR),195 one of its many accommodations of executive power is the requirement that 
the President “consult” with Congress before introducing U.S. forces into a situation 
where imminent hostilities are likely,196 a hurdle perfectly tailored to Justice Jackson’s 
permissive view of implied congressional authorization.197 
Nevertheless, the executive branch has sometimes had to use more ingenious 
means to skirt Category Three.  As previously noted, President Clinton did not seek prior 
congressional authorization before sending troops to Haiti; he maintained that doing so 
was not “constitutionally mandated,”198 despite arguments by legal scholars that he 
should “seek and obtain Congress’ express approval” before doing so.199  Above these 
bare constitutional bones, however, was appropriations legislation expressing Congress’ 
                                                 
192 Compare, e.g., Bradley & Posner, supra note 29 (viewing signing statements favorably), with 
ABA, Task Force on Presidential Signing Statements and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, Rep. with 
Recommendations 5 (2006), available at http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/aba_final_ 
signIng_statements_recommendation-report_7-24-06.pdf (describing criticisms). 
193 The capacity to substitute these later behaviors for signing statements is one difficulty for those 
singling out the latter for criticism.  See Bradley & Posner, supra note 29, at 310. 
194 Professors Barron and Lederman recently complained that scholars had almost completely 
overlooked the existence of Category Three problems in favor of Category Two analyses.  See David J. 
Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb – Framing the Problem, 
Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 699-704 (2008) [hereinafter Barron & 
Lederman I]; see also David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb 
--A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941 (2008) [hereinafter Barron & Lederman II]. 
195 Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548 (2000)). 
196 Id. § 3, 87 Stat. at 555–56. 
197 See, e.g., DAVID LOCKE HALL, THE REAGAN WARS: A CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON WAR 
POWERS AND THE PRESIDENCY 195-96 (1991) (discussing application in connection with Grenada 
deployment). 
198 See supra text accompanying note 172. 
199 See Letter from Bruce Ackerman et al. to President William J. Clinton (Aug. 31, 1994), 
reprinted in 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 127 (1995). 
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sense that appropriated funds “should not be obligated or expended for United States 
military operations in Haiti” in the absence of either advance congressional authorization 
(which did not materialize) or specified exigent circumstances (which were not 
claimed).200 It did excuse that limitation in the event that the President made a specific 
report to Congress in advance of any intended deployment201 – which the President in 
fact made.202   
The Office of Legal Counsel eventually defended President Clinton’s deployment 
of troops to Haiti as either falling within Category One, due to the implied authorization 
of Congress, or Category Two, insofar as Congress had enabled or invited measures on 
independent authority.203  The appropriations legislation was cited as favoring this result, 
even though its reporting alternative was probably intended only for limited 
peacekeeping operations – such that it would have been fairer to imply congressional 
disapproval of the President’s more substantial initiative.204  The OLC memo also cited 
the WPR as lending authority to the President, insofar as it presupposed the right of the 
President to deploy U.S. armed forces into imminent or near-imminent hostilities205 – 
which, read in light of the President’s constitutional authority, supposedly meant that the 
President might use or threaten use of troops “to achieve important diplomatic objectives 
where the risk of sustained military conflict was negligible.”206  OLC concluded, 
ultimately, that the Haiti deployment was “fully consistent . . .  with the authority 
Congress reserved to itself under [the WPR]” to determine whether further affirmative 
legislation was required.207   In effect, the WPR – if read opportunistically and in light of 
presidential authority – reinforced the claim to Category One or Category Two treatment. 
                                                 
200 Pub. L. No. 103-139, § 8147(b), 107 Stat. 1418, 1474 (1993). 
201 Id. § 8147(c), 107 Stat. at 1475. 
202 Letter to the Speaker of the United States House of Representatives from the President (Sept. 
18, 1994). 
203 Deployment of United States Armed Forces into Haiti, 18 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 173, 
174-75 (1994).  The opinion took the form of a letter opinion responding to the inquiry by four U.S. 
Senators.  For a rebuttal, see Damrosch, supra note 173, at 61-63. 
204 See Damrosch, supra note 173, at 62-63; Letter from Bruce Ackerman et al., supra note 199, at 
128-29. 
205 50 U.S.C. 1543(a)(1); see 18 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel at 175-76. 
206 Id. at 176. 
207 Id. at 177. 
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Other war powers examples are to a similar effect.  Regardless of whether the 
Youngstown framework is explicitly invoked,208 the potential negative of statutory 
constraints is often blunted by executive branch claims that they must be interpreted in 
light of powers reserved to Congress or to the President.  In addressing the use of force in 
Kosovo, for example, OLC’s discussion managed to get past both congressional reactions 
to the bombing campaign209 and the WPR,210 each of which might have warranted 
Category Three treatment, by virtue of an interpretive principle reflecting concerns about 
the ability of one Congress to bind its successors.211  In other instances, presidents have 
signaled their approach through signing statements – not merely those that signal 
constitutional objections to what Congress has legislated (which might be regarded as 
dress rehearsals for a Category Three dispute), but also those urging that an enactment 
must be construed so as to avoid constitutional objections, which at least arguably elevate 
consideration to Category Two or higher.212  The war power context is not unique in this 
regard.213   
                                                 
208 The OLC’s quite lengthy opinion regarding the use of force in Kosovo, for example, did not 
cite the framework, despite a basis for concern that the WPR had specifically foreclosed presidential 
attempts to invoke appropriations legislation as a basis for inferring congressional authorization.  See infra 
text accompanying notes 209-211. 
209 The OLC memorandum noted that the House of Representatives had defeated a resolution 
declaring a state of war, defeated (by a tie vote) a concurrent resolution that would have authorized air 
operations, and blocked funding for ground troops, while (on the plus side) defeating a resolution that 
would have required the President to remove forces from the region – concluding that all of this was 
“ambiguous.”  Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kosovo at 24, 2000 WL 33716980 (2000); see 
also Barron & Lederman II, supra note 194, at 1089.  In other hands, this might have been regarded as 
more negative in character.  See, e.g., David Gray Adler, The Clinton Theory of the War Power, 30 
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 155, 163 (2000) (deeming House votes to mean that Congress had denied President 
Clinton the legislative authorization for the use of force). 
210 The WPR prohibited the use of appropriations measures as authorizing military operations 
unless such a measure “states that it is intended to constitute specific statutory authorization within the 
meaning of this chapter.”50 U.S.C. § 1547(a)(1).   
211 Barron & Lederman II, supra note 194, at 1089 (describing this argument as “controversial”).  
With respect to congressional activity relative to the bombing campaign itself, the OLC memorandum 
considered the appropriations measure “[t]he only clear message that Congress sent regarding the 
continuation of military operations in Serbia.”  Authorization for Continuing Hostilities in Kosovo at 24, 
2000 WL 33716980 (2000).  With regard to the WPR, the OLC memorandum construed it as establishing a 
background interpretive principle only, given the constitutional difficulties that might be raised by allowing 
the enacting Congress to inhibit the authority of future legislatures.  Id. 
212 See, e.g., Barron & Lederman II, supra note 194, at 1079-80 (citing signing statement by 
President Reagan involving congressional authorization for the use of force in Lebanon); id. at 1086 (citing 
signing statement by President George H.W. Bush in connection with the Department of Defense 
Authorization Act of 1990, insofar as it apparently regulated the deployment of U.S. troops); id. at 1088 n. 
616 (citing signing statement by President Clinton in connection with the Department of Defense 
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None of these incentives originated with the Youngstown framework,214 and the 
impact is certainly at the margins.  One may question, moreover, whether any particular 
presidential gambit is wholly successful in avoiding Category Three.215  Nonetheless, 
these marginal effects may be significant and continuing,216 and the case studies 
permitting the following tentative claim:   
 
Hypothesis 3: Confronting expressions of congressional will that seem 
incompatible with executive branch activity, thus meriting Category Three, the 
President will seek to remove any incompatibility via interpretive techniques.  
 
4. The case of the Terrorist Surveillance Program.  The recent fracas over the 
Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) arguably illustrates all three hypotheses – the 
incentive to avoid seeking congressional authorization at all (for fear of rejection and 
Category Three), or at most to pursue implied authorization (because it is nearly as good, 
and less risky), and in any case to avoid an apparent conflict through interpretive 
techniques.   
                                                                                                                                                 
Appropriations Act of 1994, insofar as it arguably restricted the command and control of U.S. forces in 
Somalia). 
213 Bill to Relocate United States Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, 19 Op. Off Legal Counsel 
123, 124-26 (1995). 
214 See, e.g., Barron & Lederman II, supra note 194, at 985 (citing signing statement by President 
Buchanan). 
215 See, e.g., Erin Louise Palmer, Reinterpreting Torture: Presidential Signing Statements and the 
Circumvention of U.S. and International Law, 14 No. 1 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 21 (2006) (arguing that “[t]he 
president is acting contrary to the will of Congress when he issues signing statements offering alternative 
interpretations of Congress’ unambiguous prohibition against torture,” and quoting Justice Jackson’s 
concurrence in support of the proposition that such a circumstance falls within Category Three).  What is 
more, the very claim to such interpretive authority arguably offends another aspect of Youngstown, insofar 
as the President is assuming a role in lawmaking that is Congress’ alone.  For an early articulation of this 
position, since made many times in criticisms of President George W. Bush’s practices, see Marc N. Garber 
& Kurt A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing Statements as Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An Executive 
Aggrandizement of Power, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363, 378-83 (1987); for an assessment of the general 
separation of powers objection, see Bradley & Posner, supra note 29, at 344-47. 
216 President Obama, shortly after assuming office, issued a measured appraisal of signing 
statements, but did not eschew them – and, with respect to interpretive declarations, seemed to indicate that 
they would be adopted when reasonable.  See White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Memorandum 
for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies on Presidential Signing Statements (March 9, 2009), 
__ Fed. Reg. __ (FR Doc. E9-5442) (declaring that “I will announce in signing statements that I will 
construe a statutory provision in a manner that avoids a constitutional problem only if that construction is a 
legitimate one”).  His subsequent use has not escaped controversy.  See Charlie Savage, Obama’s Embrace 
of a Bush Tactic Riles Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2009, at A16. 
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Near the end of 2005, the New York Times revealed that the Bush Administration 
had established and conducted a wiretapping program (the TSP) notwithstanding the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which broadly regulated domestic 
electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes and subjected it to a judicial 
authorization scheme.217  There are exceptional circumstances in which a FISA court 
order need not be obtained, but none seemed to apply to the NSA program;218 given the 
secrecy surrounding the program, it is impossible to say anything with complete 
confidence, but it seems unlikely that the program would be fully consistent with FISA’s 
terms – a suspicion reinforced by the Bush Administration’s declaration that FISA was 
fundamentally unworkable.219  Rather, the main question was whether there was some 
separate statutory authority for the program, and whether that could be reconciled with a 
FISA provision that seemed to establish FISA’s exclusive governance of the situation.220 
If the TSP’s legality under FISA as it stood was at least doubtful, what prevented 
the Bush Administration from seeking amendments to FISA (or some other satisfactory 
legislative authorization) back when the program was initiated?  Ostensibly, the 
Administration elected instead to brief only “certain key members of Congress” because 
the program was so highly classified.221  The decision not to do more, however, probably 
involved a more complex calculus.  Some in the White House reportedly felt that the 
                                                 
217 James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 16, 2005, at A1; see Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 101, 
92 Stat. 1783. 
218 At the relevant time, these were described in 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802(a)(1)(A); id. § 1805(f); id. § 
1811.  They are not immediately relevant to the discussion. 
219 See, e.g., Statement of Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney Gen., Before the Comm. on the 
Judiciary, United States Senate, Concerning Oversight of the Department of Justice (July 24, 2007), 
available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=2842&wit_id=3936. 
220 Title 18, § 2511(2)(f) states that the “procedures in this chapter or chapter 121 and the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance, as 
defined in section 101 of such Act, and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic 
communications may be conducted.”  18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f).  At the same time, section 109 of FISA 
makes it unlawful to conduct electronic surveillance, “except as authorized by statute.” 50 U.S.C. § 
1809(a)(l).  The question arises, consequently, whether that “statute” must take the form of amendments to 
FISA itself, or imposes some other restrictions on the form of authorization – for example, foreclosing the 
use of a joint resolution, or requiring particularly clear expression.  
221 Press Briefing, Alberto Gonzales, Attorney Gen., and Gen. Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy 
Dir. for Nat'l Intelligence (Dec. 19, 2005), available at http://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/print/20051219-1.html [hereinafter Gonzalez-Hayden 
Briefing].  Initially only four members were briefed.  See BARTON GELLMAN, ANGLER: THE CHENEY VICE 
PRESIDENCY 153 (2008). 
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President should not ask for permission where it was not necessary – the better to 
preserve a theory of executive power.222  But others suggested an inclination to seek the 
insurance of legislative legitimacy,223 only to conclude that the prospects of success were 
sufficiently doubtful that they were outweighed by the risk of disclosure – and the risk of 
such a defeat probably reinforced the concerns of those anxious to preserve presidential 
prerogatives.  When Attorney General Gonzales was asked, shortly after the program’s 
disclosure, why he didn’t “seek a new statute that allowed something like this legally,” he 
replied:  
We've had discussions with . . . . certain members of Congress, 
about whether or not we could get an amendment to FISA, and 
we were advised that that was not likely to be – that was not 
something we could likely get, certainly not without jeopardizing 
the existence of the program, and therefore, killing the program. 
And that – and so a decision was made that because we felt that 
the authorities were there, that we should continue moving 
forward with this program.224  
                                                 
222 See, e.g, GELLMAN, supra note 221, at 153, 301. 
223 See Interview by Melissa Block with Alberto Gonzales, NPR, Jan. 24, 2006, available at 
http://prairieweather.typepad.com/the_scribe/2006/01/12406_npr_us_at.html (posing question as to why 
the Administration pursued legislative authorization when it viewed that as unnecessary, and responding 
that “Our own view is that at a time of war it's always best for the nation that the executive branch and 
legislative branch speak with one voice.”). 
224 Gonzalez-Hayden Briefing, supra note 221; see also id. (“We have had discussions with 
Congress in the past – certain members of Congress – as to whether or not FISA could be amended to allow 
us to adequately deal with this kind of threat, and we were advised that that would be difficult, if not 
impossible.”); GELLMAN, supra note 221, at 300-01 (describing Administration interest, subsequent to 
objection by Justice Department lawyers, in seeking legislative approval, and reporting exchange between 
Gonzales and Representative Harman as to the limited prospects); CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE 
RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 130 (2007) 
(describing calculation by Administration officials as to whether to seek an amendment to FISA as part of 
the Patriot Act, with the result being that “the administration decided that Congress was unlikely to simply 
exempt the National Security Agency from the traditional warrant procedure”); January 9 Scholars’ Letter, 
supra note 19, at 1367 (“Attorney General Alberto Gonzales has admitted that the administration did not 
seek to amend FISA to authorize the NSA spying program because it was advised that Congress would 
reject such an amendment”).   
Others quarreled with this pessimistic view of the legislative odds.  GELLMAN, supra note 221, at 
302 (reporting judgment of Judge Royce Lamberth).  Later Administration statements, moreover, appeared 
to place greater emphasis on the risk of “compromising the program.”  See Dep’t of Homeland Security, 
Press Release, Remarks by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff and Attorney General Alberto 
Gonzales on the USA Patriot Act (Dec. 21, 2005), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeches/speech_0265.shtm (statement of Attorney General Gonzales) (“What I 
said, or what I surely intended to say, . . . is that we consulted with leaders in the congress about the 
feasibility of legislation to allow this type of surveillance. We were advised that it would be virtually 
impossible to obtain legislation of this type without compromising the program. And I want to emphasize 
the addition of, without compromising the program. That was the concern.”); see also DOJ Legal 
Authorities, supra note 19, at 1398 n.12 (emphasizing risk of disclosure).  Both the risk of legislative 
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Which “authorities were there” already, and why they sufficed, are also questions 
of immediate relevance.  If the Administration’s subsequent legal defense of the TSP 
accurately reflected its real-time assessment,225 there were several candidates, including 
(unsurprisingly) reliance on the President’s constitutional authority.226  One defense, 
mentioned in passing, was the assertion that “[l]eaders of the Congress were briefed on 
these activities more than a dozen times.”227  This point was echoed in later, much-
controverted testimony by Attorney General Gonzales, who alluded to a process by 
which the Administration consulted with a hand-picked group of congressional leaders.228  
Some participants in those discussions recalled that legislative leaders had agreed that 
receiving informal assent through this process obviated the need for any further 
                                                                                                                                                 
failure and the risk of compromising the program seem to have played roles, and it is difficult to assess 
which mattered more – particularly when concerns about disclosure tended to be crystallized into concerns 
about efficacy.  See Hearing Before the House Judiciary Committee, Department of Justice Oversight, 
109th Cong. (2006) (testimony of Alberto Gonzales) (reporting concern “that that process of pursuing 
legislation would comprise the effectiveness of th[e] program”); HAROLD H. BRUFF, BAD ADVICE: BUSH’S 
LAWYERS IN THE WAR ON TERROR 149-50 (2009).   
225 YOO, supra note 17, at 104 (describing subsequent DOJ white paper as “defend[ing] [the 
TSP’s] legality and explain[ing] the DOJ’s legal thinking”); BRUFF, supra note 224, at 171 (suggesting that 
“the department’s original justification for the TSP was probably very similar to the way the white paper 
frames the issue”).  But see supra text accompanying note 18 (noting IG report account that OLC 
memoranda evolved so as to incorporate  Youngstown-based analysis); BRUFF, supra note 224, at 161 
(suggesting also that DOJ white paper “may have added new arguments that intervening events 
suggested”). 
226 Moschella Letter, supra note 19, at 1360-61; DOJ Legal Authorities, supra note 19, at 1379-83.  
227 Moschella Letter, supra note 19, at 1360; DOJ Legal Authorities, supra note 19, at 1378. 
228 Hearing on the Oversight of the Dep’t of Justice Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary , 110th 
Cong. (July 24, 2007) (testimony of U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales), available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/gonzalez_transcript_072407.html (describing 
“an emergency meeting in the White House Situation Room” in 2004 involving “the bipartisan leadership 
of the Congress, both House and Senate, as well as the bipartisan leadership of the House and Senate Intel 
Committees, the gang of eight,” concerning the withdrawal of Justice Department approval from continuing 
“vitally important intelligence activities despite the repeated approvals during the past two years of the 
same activities”).  His testimony did not describe the consultations in detail, and several participants – 
including Representative Pelosi and Senators Rockefeller and Daschle – disputed his account.  See 
GELLMAN, supra note 221, at 300-01 (describing contested accounts of the briefings); Unclassified IG 
Report, supra note 18, at 23 n.16.  The accuracy of Gonzales’ oversight hearings testimony was referred to 
the Office of the Inspector General, see Letter from Senator Patrick Leahy to Inspector General Fine (Aug. 
16, 2007), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200708/8-16-
07%20PJL%20ltr%20to%20Glenn%20Fine-AG.pdf; Letter from Inspector General Fine to Senator Leahy 
(Aug. 30, 2007), available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/200708/8-30-07%20fine%20to%20pjl.pdf 
(accepting assignment in principle), but the unclassified report does not resolve the dispute – seemingly 
because no attempt was made to interview congressional leaders.  Unclassified IG Report, supra note 18, at 
23 n.16; see also id. at 16 (noting NSA claims to have conducted 17 briefings of legislative leaders prior to 
the public release of the program). 
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legislative approval.229  In internal discussions of the request for Attorney General’s re-
authorization of the TSP, this was described as “a legislative remediation” that would 
resolve Justice Department objections that the program was illegal under FISA.230  
A second candidate was the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF),231 
which the Bush Administration construed to authorize warrantless communications 
intelligence as an incident of war.232  It drew succor from the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,233 in which the plurality – without itself relying on the Youngstown 
framework, though Justice Thomas’s fifth vote in favor of the authority to detain did234 – 
concluded that the wartime detention of particular individuals was “so fundamental and 
accepted an incident to war” that it fell within the AUMF’s authorization of “necessary 
and appropriate force.”235  That implication was clouded somewhat by the subsequent 
decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, in which some justices concluded that constraining 
provisions of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) established a Category Three 
case,236 while others considered that the subsequently-enacted AUMF made it fall within 
Category One.237  Nonetheless, in the TSP controversy, the Bush Administration argued 
not only that the AUMF qualified as the kind of law that authorized surveillance 
                                                 
229 As then-Speaker Dennis Hastert is said to have recounted, Vice President Cheney stated that 
“’OK, we need your understanding to go forward.  Does anybody have any objection?  Do we need to do 
anything legislatively?’ . . . And everybody agreed: no, we don’t need to do this in legislation.”  STEPHEN F. 
HAYES, CHENEY: THE UNTOLD STORY OF AMERICA’S MOST POWERFUL AND CONTROVERSIAL VICE 
PRESIDENT 389 (2007) (emphasis added).  Another, anonymous participant is reported to have said of the 
legislators participating:  “It was their unanimous recommendation that we continue with the program and 
that we not seek legislative authorization.”  Id.   This version of events was at least implicitly controverted 
by those challenging the Gonzales testimony.  
230 GELLMAN, supra note 221, at 303 (quoting reported statement by White House Counsel 
Gonzales). 
231 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
232 Moschella Letter, supra note 19, at 1361-62; DOJ Legal Authorities, supra note 19, at 1375, 
1383-90. 
233 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
234 Id. at 584 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
235 Id. at 518, 519. 
236 548 U.S. 557, 638-39 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring).  Justice Stevens, for his part, seems to 
have assumed that Category Three applied, and somehow relied on Justice Jackson’s concurrence as 
resolving the question whether Congress had the power to override the exercise of presidential authority.  
Id. at 2774 n.23.  Justice Jackson had done no such thing.  See supra text accompany note 28; Vladeck, 
supra note 189, at 960. 
237 Id. at 680-81 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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notwithstanding FISA prohibitions,238 but also that it functioned to elevate the President’s 
action to Category One, where his power was its zenith.239 
Neither argument was overpowering, to state it mildly, and each could be 
countered on the facts.  With respect to legislative consultations, several individual 
members of Congress denied having been briefed on the TSP specifics.240  Senator 
Daschle, for his part, asserted that the Administration had in 2001 proposed specific 
language that would have encompassed the program, but that it had been rejected.241  
Everyone involved had substantial reason to dissemble, and little progress was made in 
reconciling the claims;242 of course, the inability to get to the bottom of the matter just 
showed why the President might prefer being rejected informally over having a bill’s 
failure evidenced in the Congressional Record.  
With respect to the AUMF, the flaws in the Administration’s case were more 
easily ascertained.  Critics observed that (unlike the detention issue considered in Hamdi) 
Congress had specifically attempted to restrict intelligence gathering under FISA; what is 
more, title 18 indicated that Congress intended the electronic surveillance to be governed 
exclusively by other means.243  As compared to Youngstown, the argument against 
Category One, and in favor of Category Three, seemed compelling: For electronic 
surveillance, Congress had specifically provided that the statutory mechanism was 
exclusive (which was more than could be fairly said for the Taft-Hartley Act), and 
established criminal sanctions for anyone failing to respect that exclusive mechanism.  
                                                 
238 50 U.S.C. § 1809(a)(1) (prohibiting any person from intentionally “engag[ing] . . . in electronic 
surveillance under color of law except as authorized by statute”); see Moschella Letter, supra note 19; DOJ 
Legal Authorities, supra note 19, at 1393.  
239 Moschella Letter, supra note 19, at 1361 (“Because communications intelligence activities 
constitute, to use the language of Hamdi, a fundamental incident of waging war, the AUMF clearly and 
unmistakably authorizes such activities directed against the communications of our enemy. Accordingly, 
the President’s ‘authority is at its maximum.’”) (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 
579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring), Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981), and 
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585); DOJ Legal Authorities, supra note 19, at 1374, 1389. 
240 See supra text accompanying note 228. 
241 Richard W. Stevenson, Congress Never Authorized Spying Effort, Daschle Says, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 24, 2005, at 12; see Tom Daschle, The Power We Didn’t Grant, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 2005, at A21.  
But see YOO, supra note 17, at 116 (stating that Daschle’s claim “does not ring true”). 
242 See supra text accompanying note 18 (noting the failure to address in the unclassified IG 
report). 
243 January 9 Scholars’ Letter, supra note 19; February 2 Scholars’ Letter, supra note 19, citing 18 
U.S.C. § 2511(2)(f) (providing that FISA and the criminal code are the “exclusive means” for conducting 
electronic surveillance); id. § 2511 (criminalizing wiretapping except as “specifically provided in this 
chapter,” § 2511(1), or as authorized by FISA, § 2511(2)(e)). 
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Regardless, the Bush Administration’s post-FISA conduct, and its rationalization, 
reflected a dangerous appreciation of the Youngstown framework’s parameters.  Its basic 
behavior reflected the pattern that Justice Jackson may be credited for anticipating – it 
acted unilaterally, and then discounted the value of seeking overt legislative 
authorization.  (One critic, writing without any over reference to Youngstown, 
nonetheless put the matter just about perfectly: “[t]he administration, having the program 
in place, had little incentive to press for legislation that might restrict its activities.”244)  
From that same vantage, though, proceeding informally with Congress – even to the point 
of vetting proposed language with its members – ran less risk of shifting the standard of 
review to that for Category Three.   
To be sure, the case study is not without its complexities, some of which cast 
doubt on the motivational significance of Youngstown described in the first two 
hypotheses.  The upside of informality was eventually compromised by the subsequent 
dispute over whether implicit authorization had in fact been received – an inevitable risk 
of that approach – and it turned out that Congress was ultimately willing to endorse the 
Administration’s policy; were all this understood, other contextual factors, like the need 
to preserve secrecy for purposes of national security, and the potential for that same 
secrecy and non-justiciability to keep any dispute out of the courts, loom larger.  These 
same features, though, may speak more to the stringency of the conditions than to the 
hypotheses’ potential.  To choose another example, the Administration’s other argument 
for implied authority, the AUMF, might have been plausible were it not for the fact that 
FISA anticipated such claims.  Precisely because FISA was crafted in reaction to 
previous extravagant executive branch claims of authority, including implied authority, it 
created a hostile environment for claims of the type that were nonetheless made – and 
one might legitimately worry about how matters would play out in a less practiced 
setting. 
The TSP controversy provided less contemporary evidence for (or against) the 
third hypothesis, because when the smoke eventually cleared the executive branch wound 
up getting much of what it wanted from Congress via the 2007 Protect America Act and 
                                                 
244 BRUFF, supra note 224, at 158. 
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its amendments.245  In consequence, there was no particular cause for President Bush to 
qualify the legislation with a signing statement,246 and there has been as yet no evidence 
of any other post-hoc qualification.  Yet kindred arguments were made relative to the 
original statute.  Thus, in defending the TSP’s consistency with FISA, the Justice 
Department emphasized that: (1) the AUMF must be considered an authorizing “statute” 
within the meaning of section 109 of FISA247 because, inter alia, Congress must be free 
to use general authorizing language in order to respect the President’s constitutional 
authority to defend the United States from foreign attack;248 (2) section 109 of FISA must 
be read to permit authorization other than through revision to FISA itself, and section 111 
of FISA249 (which authorized unfettered electronic surveillance for a limited period 
following a declaration of war) could not be read to establish the limits of electronic 
surveillance during wartime, because either reading would suppose a constitutionally 
problematic capacity of the FISA-enacting Congress to bind a succeeding legislature;250 
and (3) both provisions, and relevant sections of Title 18,251 should be read less 
restrictively in order to avoid the serious constitutional questions raised by encroaching 
on the President’s powers to make tactical military decisions.252   
                                                 
245 For discussion of the 2008 amendments and how they changed the status quo - and how the 
status quo should be reckoned - see, inter alia, Marty Lederman, The Privacy-Protective Components of the 
New FISA Law, BALKIN, July 11, 2008, http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/07/privacy-protective-
components-of-new.html; David Kris, A Guide to the New FISA Bill, part I, BALKIN, June 21, 2008, 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/guide-to-new-fisa-bill-part-i.html, part II, BALKIN, June 22, 2008, 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/guide-to-new-fisa-bill-part-ii.html, & part III, BALKIN, June 25, 2008, 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/06/guide-to-new-fisa-bill-part-iii.html. 
246 Even so, some feared that one would be issued.  See Jack Balkin, The New FISA Law and the 
Construction of the National Surveillance State, BALKIN, July 10, 2008, 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2008/07/new-fisa-law-and-construction-of.html.  The President’s remarks on 
signing the legislation into law were benign in character.  Press Release, Remarks by the President In 
Signing of H.R. 6304, FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (July 10, 2008), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/archive/ll/docs/fisa-amendments-act-2008.pdf. 
247 See  supra text accompanying note 220. 
248 See DOJ Legal Authorities, supra note 19, at 1397-98; compare Memorandum from David 
Kris, former Assistant Deputy Att'y Gen. 3-4 (Jan. 25, 2006), available at 
http://balkin.blogspot.com/kris.fisa.pdf (suggesting the likelier objective was to require that authorization 
be explicit). 
249 50 U.S.C. § 1811. 
250 DOJ Legal Authorities, supra note 19, at 1394-95, 1399. 
251 18 U.S.C. 2511(2)(e), (f); see supra text accompanying note 220. 
252 DOJ Legal Authorities, supra note 19, at 1401. 
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These arguments did not receive widespread endorsement.253  But the first two 
related directly to the question of which Youngstown category the President’s activity 
occupied,254 while the third concerned whether Youngstown was differentiable for 
purposes of resolving a clash within Category Three255 and, less overtly, for purposes of 
construing FISA so as to wrench the dispute out of Category Three altogether.256  The 
upshot, certainly, was that not all is lost even when Congress has spoken. 
 
C. Dynamic Effects on Congressional Behavior 
Justice Jackson did not address the executive branch’s adaptive behavior, but he 
did briefly signal his skepticism that Congress would ever change..257  It might have 
seemed hubristic for him to address in detail how Congress would react to his framework, 
let alone to celebrate its benefits, given that his was but one of many opinions.  But now 
that history has deemed his approach the prevailing one, it is worth reexamining his 
appraisal in light of his own handiwork – and to start with his own experience. 
1. The (first) wiretapping controversy.  While the technology of modern 
electronic surveillance might surprise Justice Jackson, the nature of the TSP dispute 
would not in the least.  Jackson was himself a key figure in FDR’s domestic wiretapping 
program while he was Solicitor General and Attorney General.258  As if to deepen the 
connection, the Bush Administration cited FDR’s wiretapping as precedent for the TSP 
program,259 just as the Truman Administration in Youngstown had invoked FDR’s 
policies – also championed by Jackson – in support of seizure authority. 
The precedent of FDR’s wiretapping program was not necessarily redemptive.  In 
a fair-minded appraisal of the Bush Administration argument, Neal Katyal and Richard 
                                                 
253 See February 2 Scholars’ Letter, supra note 19, at 1416-22.  
254 E.g., DOJ Legal Authorities, supra note 19, at 1401 (concluding that, based on the appropriate 
interpretive presumptions, “[w]hen the President authorizes electronic surveillance against the enemy 
pursuant to the AUMF, he is therefore acting at the height of his authority under Youngstown”). 
255 Id. at 1406-07. 
256 Id. at 1407-08. 
257 See supra text accompanying notes 137-138. 
258 ROBERT H. JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER'S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT (John 
Q. Barrett ed., 2003). 
259 DOJ Legal Authorities, supra note 19, at 7-8, 16-17; Moschella Letter, supra note 19, at 3. 
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Caplan do not so much defend FDR’s program as acknowledge that it, too, should be 
deemed to have fallen into Category Three and struck down.260   Jackson himself which 
showed little enthusiasm for the program or its legality; by his account, “[t]he only case 
that I recall in which [FDR] declined to abide by a decision of the Supreme Court was its 
decision that federal law enforcement officers could not legally tap wires.”261 
  The more interesting question, for instant purposes, is how the incident might 
have influenced Justice Jackson’s perspective in Youngstown, particular concerning 
Congress.  Jackson helped in an attempt to get legislation authorizing domestic 
wiretapping,262 but Congress failed to act, despite some knowledge of ongoing abuses.263  
Jackson also helped sculpt the Administration’s message that wiretapping had been 
suspended because of an adverse Supreme Court decision.  True to that message, Jackson 
did resist J. Edgar Hoover’s campaigns to resume the program.  Later, though, after being 
overruled by FDR, Jackson resuscitated legal defenses of the activity and told Congress 
simply that the Administration had not foreclosed the possibility of wiretapping – without 
acknowledging that it was already ongoing – and actually implied that the executive 
branch lacked authority in light of existing law.264 
Jackson wound up blaming Congress, accusing its dawdling of driving FDR to 
issue his secret authorization.265  The conclusion seems unfair – Congress looked into the 
matter and refused to legalize the activity266 – but it probably reflects Jackson’s mindset 
in Youngstown, and perhaps fueled his pessimistic remarks about congressional 
leadership.  From Jackson’s perspective, his framework probably established the best 
incentives that might be envisioned: If Congress was cautioned that its acquiescence 
might result in a more favorable judicial regard for the President’s activities, as indicated 
by Category Two (and Category One), its members might be encouraged to share their 
views more overtly. 
                                                 
260 Neal Katyal & Richard Caplan, The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the Legality of the NSA 
Surveillance Program: The FDR Precedent, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1023 (2008). 
261 JACKSON, supra note 258, at 68. 
262 See Katyal & Caplan, supra note 260, at 1043-44, 1052-53. 
263 Id. at 1047. 
264 Id. at 1047-61. 
265 JACKSON, supra note 258, at 48.  
266 Katyal & Caplan, supra note 260, at 1052. 
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2. Congress and categories.  Such a theory would not, however, have been 
especially robust.  Justice Jackson was, as a general matter, skeptical about attempts to 
understand the legislative intent behind statutory text.267 His own experience with 
wiretapping legislation suggested that similar problems might beset attempts to 
understand congressional inaction (which might, for instance, connote either 
steadfastness or acquiescence).  Nonetheless, his Youngstown framework required 
scrutinizing the presence or absence of particular reactions by Congress.  When Congress 
acts in some regard, or instead fails to act, what is it communicating? 
Speaking abstractly, Congress may authorize presidential action for a variety of 
reasons.  First, it may want to assent to the President’s decision on the merits, without 
regard to whether legislative endorsement is surplusage.  Second, it may be uncertain as 
to whether the President otherwise has authority.  Third, it may be dubious that the 
President otherwise has authority, so that congressional approval is essential.  Fourth, it 
may regard the President’s assertion of authority as plausible, and feel indifferent to its 
instant assertion – but wish to preserve the legislature’s capacity to take a position in 
some future controversy (in which it might oppose a presidential initiative and withhold 
its assent) to the effect that the President lacks such power.   
Needless to say, it is hard to say which view(s) Congress holds in any particular 
situation.  One implication, though, is that we should not blithely conclude that 
congressional authorization adds to, or helps maximize, presidential authority in the 
Category One sense.  Congress may desire to do nothing more than replicate the 
President’s already-existing independent authority, or it may be differing – via its 
institutional capacity to construe the Constitution – with the assertion that the President 
has such an independent authority.  Sometimes, accordingly, Category One will 
considerably overstate how much presidential authority should be enhanced by 
congressional approval. 
                                                 
267 Jackson was regarded at the time as a leading critic of the use of legislative history.  See, e.g., 
Richard A. Danner, Justice Jackson’s Lament: Historical and Comparative Perspectives on the Availability 
of Legislative History, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 151 (2003); Jackson, supra note 114, 8 F.R.D. at 124-
25; Note, A Re-Evaluation of the Use of Legislative History in the Federal Courts, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 125, 
125 (1952).  His ambivalence toward such inquiries was nearly matched by his skepticism about attempts 
to understand statutory text unaided, and his bottom line was that the courts – ideally, with the assistance of 
Congress – needed something like the federal rules for statutory interpretation.  See Jackson, supra note 
114, 8 F.R.D. at 124, 125-26.   
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Conversely, congressional failure to act – particularly its failure to adopt some 
proposed measure – may be variously explained.  Congress may simply be attempting to 
withhold its assent (that is Justice Jackson’s supposition, save where more evidence can 
be found that of “inertia, indifference or quiescence”).  But Congress may also fail to act, 
or withhold authority, because it perceives that the President already has sufficient 
authority.  It might, for example, regard its intervention as unnecessary and a waste of 
scarce resources; it might be uncertain as to the political consequences, and desire to bide 
its time; it might anticipate various adverse consequences from making the authority 
plain.268  This means that some Category Two and Category Three cases will be 
misclassified.  Even in declining to act and manifesting what may be construed as an 
implied negative, Congress may have behaved consistent with a belief that the President 
has sufficient authority; its reluctance, if anything, should be classified within Category 
Two, or perhaps even as the implied authorization species of Category One. 
Accordingly, even if we can tell whether Congress was acting or failing to act – or 
behaving in any of the range of behaviors sketched in Category Two269 – understanding 
the significance of that behavior is no less difficult than the statutory interpretation 
questions that vexed Justice Jackson.  This suggests a fourth and final hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Attributing categorical significance to congressional action (or 
inaction) – beyond assessing whether Congress has authorized or prohibited the 
executive branch activity – effectively substitutes judicial for congressional 
judgment.  
 
Superficially, this is different in character from the earlier hypotheses, which 
involved the executive branch’s reaction to the Youngstown framework.  Here, the issue 
more closely resembles one of ex post classification, not unlike any problem of statutory 
interpretation and legislative intent.  Ex ante attempts by Congress to anticipate the 
Youngstown framework are much harder to evidence, perhaps because as a collegial body 
                                                 
268 The last point, for example, was emphasized – unsuccessfully – by the Solicitor General’s 
Youngstown brief to explain why Congress resisted adding seizure authority to the Taft-Hartley scheme: 
Supposedly, Congress thought doing so would create a too-ready, irresistible mechanism for thwarting 
collective bargaining, but did not oppose presidential reliance on more indirect legislative or inherent 
executive authority.  See supra text accompanying note 177. 
269 See supra text accompanying notes 75-76. 
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Congress is much less likely to incorporate any single legal expectation.  Nevertheless, 
members of Congress are well aware of the Youngstown framework,270 and sometimes it 
is directly invoked.  In enacting FISA, for example, Congress deleted a provision 
recognizing the President’s inherent authority to conduct intelligence surveillance, and 
added language to the effect that the statutory scheme “shall be the exclusive means” by 
which covered activities were to be conducted – striking, in conference, the House’s 
original preference for adverting to the exclusive “statutory” means.271  The House 
Conference Report explained: 
The conferees agree that the establishment by this act of 
exclusive means by which the President may conduct electronic 
surveillance does not foreclose a different decision by the 
Supreme Court. The intent of the conferees is to apply the 
standard set forth in Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion in the 
Steel Seizure case: “When a President takes measures 
incompatible with the express or implied will of Congress, his 
power is at the lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his 
own constitutional power minus any constitutional power of 
Congress over the matter.” Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952).272 
 
Congress’ apparent objective was to relegate review of any non-statutory 
presidential action to Category Three.  The opposite may also be attempted.  For 
example, a 2008 bill would have reauthorized the use of military force, and provided for 
significant ancillary powers, while indicating that nothing in the legislation was intended 
to encroach upon preexisting presidential authority.273  Somewhat more ambiguously, the 
preamble to the AUMF recalled that “the President has authority under the Constitution 
                                                 
270 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 24. 
271 For discussion, see CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 22, at 27-28. 
272 H. Conf. Rep. No. 95-1720, at 35, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4064 (Oct. 5, 1978); see also S. Rep. 
No. 95-604(I) at 62-65, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3964-66; S. Rep. No. 95-701 at 71-72, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 
4040-41.  Rather half-heartedly, the Justice Department’s memo relating to the TSP noted this language 
and remarked that “[i]t is significant, however, that Congress did not decide conclusively to continue to 
push the boundaries of its constitutional authority in wartime,” noting the provisions establishing a fifteen-
day period in which the President could fail to comply with FISA requirements.  DOJ Legal Authorities, 
supra note 19, at 1391-92. 
273 Enemy Combatant Detention Review Act of 2008, S. 3401, § 2(a) (intr. July 31, 2008), 
(establishing “rule of construction” that “[t]he authority under this section shall not be construed to alter or 
limit the authority of the President under the Constitution of the United States to detain combatants in the 
continuing armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces, or in any other armed 
conflicts”).  A similar bill was simultaneously introduced in the House, see H.R. 6705 (intr. July 31, 2008); 
neither made it out of committee. 
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to take action to deter and prevent acts of international terrorism against the United 
States.”274  In the recent volleying over the TSP, the Bush Administration argued that this 
text contributed to a finding that the program should be reviewed within Category One.275 
These unusually deliberate attempts by Congress to define the relationship 
between legislative and executive branch authority show the likely limits of such 
exercises.  Doing so explicitly might be consistent with an overall objective of reclaiming 
authority from the executive branch (though perhaps it is also reclaiming ground from the 
judiciary, which may be resisted on constitutional grounds).276  But in the ordinary case, 
the initial question of whether Congress is even attempting to render a categorical 
decision – and, assuming it has, what constitutional judgment it has assumed as its 
background condition – is itself interpolated by the judiciary.  It is hard to say whether 
what remains of authentically congressional judgment is consistent with the 
congressional authority that Youngstown purportedly secured. 
Even when Congress is focused on the question, it is difficult for it to express a 
sufficiently distinct sense of the presidential authority it is either preserving or denying.  
If Congress nods toward Category One by acknowledging the President’s authority under 
the Constitution, its meaning almost inevitably depends on an independent examination 
of that authority by the judiciary, which Congress may or may not have perfectly 
anticipated.  If Congress attempts to relegate an activity to Category Three, the same 
problem ensues, with the additional question as to whether Congress understood its 
authority (or any residual presidential authority) to be plenary in character.  In 
consequence, the nuances of congressional expressions are largely wasted, and the 
judiciary’s construction of the constitutional backdrop against which Congress legislates 
makes all the difference.   
3. Youngstown goes abroad.  The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Medellín 
v. Texas makes all this abundantly clear.277   That case concerned the domestic 
                                                 
274 See AUMF, supra note 231. 
275 DOJ Legal Authorities, supra note 19, at 1382-84. 
276 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 535-36 (1997) (invalidating congressional attempt 
to impose strict scrutiny standard for state laws burdening the free exercise of religion, in part on grounds 
that it encroached on the judicial function). 
277 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008). 
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consequences for a death-row prisoner of a decision by the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ), which had held that the United States violated the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations.278 A separate treaty, the U.N. Charter, was acknowledged to create an 
international obligation to comply,279 but the question was whether it also established an 
obligation in domestic law that bound U.S. courts.  The petitioner had two theories as to 
why it did: first, because the ICJ decision had legal force in and of itself; second, because 
that decision was binding by virtue of President Bush’s order implementing it.280 
The Court rejected both arguments, reasoning in effect that the failure of the first 
– because the U.N. Charter was non-self-executing, and the ICJ decision consequently 
did not bind U.S. courts281 – doomed the second.  But the parties also cast the issue of the 
President’s authority in Youngstown framework terms.  Defenders of the President’s 
authority claimed that it was properly reviewed under Category One,282 while those 
objecting depicted it as falling within Category Three.283 Neither camp offered 
particularly compelling reasons why its depiction was to be preferred, let alone why the 
framework was probative, but each regarded its depiction as pretty much decisive of the 
question of constitutional authority. 
                                                 
278  Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex.v.U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12; see 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, [1970] 21 U.S.T. 77, T.I.A.S. No. 6820. 
279 U. N. Charter art. 94(1), 59 Stat. 1051, T.S. No. 993 (1945) (“[e]ach Member of the United 
Nations undertakes to comply with the decision of the [ICJ] in any case to which it is a party”).  A third 
treaty vested the International Court of Justice with jurisdiction.  Optional Protocol Concerning the 
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes to the Vienna Convention (Optional Protocol or Protocol), Apr. 24, 
1963, [1970] 21 U.S.T. 325, T.I.A.S. No. 6820. 
280 Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Alberto R. Gonzales, U.S. Attorney Gen. 
(Feb. 28, 2005), available at http:// www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050228-18.html. 
281 128 S. Ct. at 1358-61. 
282 Brief for Petitioner at 34-37, Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984) 
(indicating that the presidential memorandum should be reviewed according to Category One or, at worst, 
Category Two); Reply Brief for Petitioner at 12, Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984) 
(invoking Category One); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9-11, 
Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984) (invoking Category One, but noting novelty of 
treaty context); id. at 11 n.2 (stating that “[a]t an absolute minimum then, this case involves a valid 
Presidential action in the context of Congressional “acquiescence”). 
283 Brief for Respondent at 16-17, Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008) (No. 06-984). 
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Reacting to the Category One portrayal,284 the Court said that it fell to the treaty-
makers in combination to establish a self-executing treaty, and then to Congress to 
implement a non-self-executing one.  It elaborated: 
A non-self-executing treaty . . . is one that was ratified with the 
understanding that it is not to have domestic effect of its own 
force. That understanding precludes the assertion that Congress 
has implicitly authorized the President-acting on his own-to 
achieve precisely the same result.  . . .  [G]iven the absence of 
congressional legislation, . . . the non-self-executing treaties at 
issue here did not "express[ly] or implied[ly]" vest the President 
with the unilateral authority to make them self-executing.  . . .  
Accordingly, the President's Memorandum does not fall within 
the first category of the Youngstown framework. 
Indeed, . . . the non-self-executing character of the relevant 
treaties not only refutes the notion that the ratifying parties 
vested the President with the authority to unilaterally make treaty 
obligations binding on domestic courts, but also implicitly 
prohibits him from doing so. When the President asserts the 
power to "enforce" a non-self-executing treaty by unilaterally 
creating domestic law, he acts in conflict with the implicit 
understanding of the ratifying Senate. His assertion of authority, 
insofar as it is based on the pertinent non-self-executing treaties, 
is therefore within Justice Jackson's third category, not the first 
or even the second. 
 
The parties’ invocation of the Youngstown framework, and the Court’s 
conclusions on that topic, were nearly by analogy.  It is far from clear that the President 
and Senate could, even if they so desired, establish the self-executing character of a treaty 
if the treaty as rendered by international negotiations for all parties had not285 – and, as 
Justice Breyer protested in his Medellín dissent, the question is one that treaties rarely 
address.286  Equally important, the Court’s portrayal of the Senate’s implicit 
                                                 
284 Id. at 1368 (noting claim that “because the relevant treaties ‘create an obligation to comply with 
Avena,’ they ‘implicitly give the President authority to implement that treaty-based obligation’” such that 
“the President's Memorandum is well grounded in the first category of the Youngstown framework”). 
The Court separately addressed the President’s argument that, in the alternative, the Memorandum 
should be evaluated under Category Two, but found it wanting under that analysis as well.  Id. at 1370-71.   
285 But see, e.g., S. EXEC. REP. 110-12, Extradition Treaties with the European Union, 110th 
Cong., 2d Sess., at 9-10 (proposing declaration of self-execution in resolution of advice and consent).  The 
problem has to do with the capacity of the President and Senate to make law independent of that dictated by 
an international agreement.  For discussion, see Edward T. Swaine, Non-Self-Execution and the Non-
Separation of Powers (draft on file with author). 
286 128 S. Ct. at 1380-1382, 1383 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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understanding was essentially made up.  It was difficult to reconstruct the treaty-makers’ 
understanding of whether Article 94 of the U.N. Charter was self-executing,287 and the 
Court seemed to impute its understanding to them.288   
What was most significant, however, was that the Court not only guessed as to 
whether the treaty was regarded as self-executing when ratified, but also imputed to 
Congress its conception of what it meant to be non-self-executing.  Prior to Medellín, the 
character of the non-self-executing determination was uncertain.  Some thought it 
pertained only to whether a private party could enforce a treaty (an inquiry that the Court 
differentiated, not without reason).289  It was more plausible that even if a non-self-
executing treaty stopped short of establishing federal law “by itself,” it might achieve that 
status through non-statutory acts – such as by an executive order.290  The Court appeared 
to reject this possibility, however, by suggesting that the treaty’s lack of “domestic 
effect” could be cured only by Congress.  Certainly this outcome – which accentuated 
tensions with the Supremacy Clause’s instruction that “all” treaties made by the United 
States “shall” be supreme law – might not fully have been appreciated by the President 
and Senate when ratifying the U.N. Charter several years prior to Youngstown.  They may 
instead have envisioned that the treaty permitted (without necessarily delegating) a 
degree of presidential authority to ensure compliance with an internationally binding 
obligation that also appeared to bind the executive branch domestically.291 
At one level, this is just another instance of judicial misdirection: that is, the 
conventional problem that when the Court purports to be discovering congressional will, 
                                                 
287 The Court did cite evidence of the executive branch’s understanding of the U.N. Charter, see 
128 S. Ct. at 1359, but it misunderstood its import: in the cited passages, and in others to which the Court 
did not allude, the question was the character of the international legal obligation, not the domestic effect as 
law.  See Swaine, supra note 37, at 374 n.226. 
288 See Frederick L. Kirgis, International Law in the American Courts - The United States 
Supreme Court Declines to Enforce the I.C.J.'s Avena Judgment Relating to a U.S. Obligation Under the 
Convention on Consular Relations, 9 GERMAN L.J. 619, 629 (2008) (“[T]he Supreme Court majority's 
argument . . . is a classic case of bootstrapping: the Justices imputed to the Senate a conclusion the Court 
reached many years later in the case at hand, and the same Justices then relied on it to determine the 
Senate's original “implicit understanding.” Congress, or in this instance the Senate, simply had no 
expressed or implied will on whether these provisions are or should be self-executing. Consequently the 
case fell within Justice Jackson’s second category, not his third category.”). 
289 128 S. Ct. at 1356 n.3; contrast David Sloss, Ex parte Young and Federal Remedies for Human 
Rights Treaty Violations, 75 WASH. L. REV. 1103 (2000). 
290 See Swaine, supra note 37, at 353-59. 
291 For a defense of this position, see Swaine, supra note 37. 
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particularly when going beyond statutory text, it is really expressing its own – usurping 
congressional authority even in the guise of protecting that authority against the executive 
branch.292  Within the Youngstown framework, distinctly, such errors in discerning 
Congress’s implicit preferences make a categorical difference.  Even by this standard, 
though, the effect in Medellín was striking.  Youngstown rejected an attempt at 
presidential bootstrapping, insofar as Truman sought to capitalize on a situation involving 
his own use of force;293 in Medellín, the predicate for presidential implementation was a 
treaty that had received the advice and consent of the Senate, which the Court took to be 
the equivalent of a legislative act.294  Here, then, the sounder objection was that the 
decision occasioned judicial bootstrapping, given that the Court’s convictions were 
attributed to Congress and then exploited by the Court itself.295 
IV. RE-SEIZING YOUNGSTOWN 
Assume, for the sake of discussion, that one embraced the pro-congressional ends 
of the Youngstown framework, but accepted the force of the above criticisms: namely, 
that the framework established institutional incentives that might undermine those ends – 
perhaps only to the extent that tempered Youngstown’s virtues at the margins, or perhaps 
even to the point that it backfired.  How might Youngstown, or at least its ultimate 
objectives, be redeemed?  Equally important, could that be accomplished without 
undermining its signal attribute – its potential encouragement, via the judiciary, of 
cooperative endeavors between the political branches? 
Fully elaborating a program for shoring up Congress’ functions, while preserving 
the constitutional prerogatives of the President and the judiciary, is quite beyond the 
scope of this Article, but it is worthwhile to indicate several possible types of approaches 
that might better reconcile the Youngstown framework’s operation with its ambitions.    
Probably the most modest solution would be to spur courts applying the framework to 
                                                 
292 Cf. TRIBE, supra note 109, at 204-05. 
293 Paulsen, supra note 2, at 216 (stating that “Youngstown holds that the President, as chief 
executive, may not ‘execute’ laws of his own making: the President of the United States may not 
constitutionally legislate on his own authority, ever”). 
294 See Swaine, supra note 37, at 349-50 (exploring the anti-bootstrapping reading of Youngstown, 
and its qualified application to treaty-based situations). 
295 See Kirgis, supra note 288, at 629. 
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resolve doubts in Congress’s favor.  The first major test of the framework, in Dames & 
Moore, did not auger well on that score; the framework’s more fleeting influence in cases 
like Crosby,296 Hamdi,297 and Hamdan298 may be debated; and its manipulability is 
routinely demonstrated in the lower courts.299  Even its triumph in Medellín, in which the 
Court invalidated an executive branch action in an area dominated by the President, 
proved to be a mixed bag.  Putting aside whether the Court correctly surmised the 
preferences of the Senate,300 or truly imagined itself as constraining the executive 
branch,301 Medellín also suggests that the Court may be gun-shy in employing the 
Youngstown framework to constrain executive branch authority.  Having determined that 
the President’s Memorandum was best assessed under Category Three, Chief Justice 
Roberts added “insofar as [the President’s asserted authority] is based on the pertinent 
non-self-executing treaties.”302  He then analyzed the President’s separate assertion of 
independent foreign affairs authority to resolve claims disputes as something more like a 
                                                 
296 Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 375 (2000) (applying the Youngstown 
framework and Category One to establish that presidential policy had preemptive effect); see supra text 
accompanying note 72. 
297 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (supporting authority to 
detain, and establishing majority with respect to that question, by invoking Youngstown framework and 
Category One); see supra text accompanying notes 15, 27, 233-235. 
298 Hamdan 548 U.S. 557, 638-39 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) (identifying Category Three 
case); id. at 680-81 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying notes 15, 27, 236-237. 
299 For example, the en banc Fourth Circuit recently decided an important challenge to the 
classification of a U.S. resident alien as an enemy combatant and his detention on that basis; the principal 
concurring opinion to the per curiam order approached the executive branch determination as falling within 
Category Three, see al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2008) (Motz, J., concurring), 
whereas the dissents described it as a Category One case.  Id. at  287 (Williams, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part); id. at 302-03, 312 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
300 But see S. EXEC. REP. 110-12, supra note 285, at 10 (stating that, contra Medellín, “in the 
committee’s view, a strong presumption should exist against the conclusion in any particular case that the 
United States lacks the necessary authority in U.S. law to implement obligations it has assumed under 
treaties that have received the advice and consent of the Senate”). 
301 The dynamic in that case – which pitched the executive branch not against Congress, but 
against the State of Texas, and in which it sought not to fulfill an autonomous policy preference but rather 
the judgment against it rendered by the ICJ in favor of Mexico – suggested the possibility that the Court 
was doing the President a favor by entertaining his good-faith request but refusing him.  Indeed, the Court 
noted that the United States continued to disagree with the legal result, meaning that its only interest was in 
discharging (or, at least, trying earnestly to discharge) the judgment.  Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 
1361 (2008).  In that connection, the Court also indicated that the executive branch’s understanding of the 
treaty in question – which lay at the heart of the Court’s conclusion that the executive branch lacked 
implementing authority, as well as its conclusion that the ICJ decision lacked legal force in and of itself – 
was entitled to “great weight.”  Id. at 1361 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
302 128 S. Ct. at 1369. 
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Category Two issue.303  This is not how Justice Jackson proceeded – he did not suggest 
that the President’s authority was best analyzed under Category Three only insofar as it 
was based on some statute, then start afresh when it came to claims based on the 
Commander-in-Chief power – and perhaps lets slip misgivings about shortchanging the 
executive branch.304  In light of this experience, expecting the courts to right the course 
sua sponte may be a bit starry-eyed. 
A second, more ambitious approach would be to supplement the Youngstown 
framework by adding to the congressional toolkit.  For example, one might enhance 
Justice Jackson’s solicitude for informal congressional will by embracing legislative soft 
law.  Within the framework itself, the reckoning of congressional preferences might be 
improved by distinguishing more carefully among possible indicia; for example, as others 
have argued, a concurrent resolution may be a better signal of congressional views than 
even a statute, since in the absence of presentment there is no need to incorporate the 
President’s preferences, and it is certainly more refined than legislative history.305  
Outside the framework’s bounds, courts might invoke the more reliable species of soft 
law in interpreting statutes.306  Such tactics are hardly risk-free, of course, even putting 
aside constitutional and legal process objections.  Soft law might just as easily enable 
presidential unilateralism: if the House or Senate choose to adopt a one-chamber 
resolution supporting presidential action, that might well count toward Category One, at 
least if the framework were made more amenable to soft law.  Congress might also 
employ soft law measures as a less taxing alternative to adopting statutes, which might let 
it off the hook too easily – and, ultimately, diminish congressional constraints on the 
executive branch.307   
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the framework might be reinforced through 
statutory fixes designed to put Congress on a better footing.  Dean Koh’s proposal for 
                                                 
303 Id. at 1371. 
304 See also id. at 1390-91 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (indicating misgivings about limiting executive 
branch authority in that area). 
305 See Gersen & Posner, supra note 108, at 595-96. 
306 See Gersen & Posner, supra note 108, at 607-20 (defending such use as constitutional and 
prudent). 
307 Compare Gersen & Posner, supra note 108, at 588-91 (considering soft law as signals of future 
statutory action, but not directly addressing substitutability); id. at 597-99 (considering possible benefits of 
statutes over soft law, including bindingness, public notice, and presidential involvement).  
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restoring the National Security Constitution, for example, was an unabashed plea for hard 
legal fixes, albeit in the form of framework statutes.308  For reasons already discussed, 
Koh’s confidence that the Youngstown framework is a constructive part of that 
constitution may be misplaced,309 and asking process-oriented statutes to realign the 
incentives of the Congress, the courts, and the President may be asking too much.310  
Nevertheless, such statutes might at the margins benefit from and help reinforce 
congressionally-initiated policymaking (Figure 1, vice Figures 2-5).  Absent a 
transformative effect on the institutions involved, there is reason to doubt that they would 
fully cure the problems that Youngstown sought to fix, or for that matter cure 
Youngstown’s own ills.  Once framework statutes were enacted, the initial move in any 
policy context would remain the President’s, who could act unilaterally yet again; the end 
result may be like issuing one (unenforceable) traffic citation after another for the same 
moving violation.  A key ingredient would necessarily be a newly aggressive judiciary,311 
which may encounter its own constraints in unilateral politics games.312 
A third, yet more radical approach would be to prune the Youngstown framework 
of its counterproductive elements.  One could imagine, for example, a tripartite 
framework for evaluating challenges to executive branch action that took the following 
form: 
1.  The action may be sustained on the basis that it is authorized 
by statute or treaty, unless that authorization exceeds the power 
of the legislative branch or the power of the government as a 
whole.313 
2.  The action may be sustained on the basis of the President’s 
constitutional authority, unless that authority has lawfully been 
constrained by statute or treaty or exceeds the power of 
government as a whole. 
                                                 
308 E.g., KOH, supra note 30, at 203-07. 
309 See id. at 106-13 (describing the Youngstown framework as a salutary way in which the 
National Security Constitution has been “embroidered”); id. at 134-46 (describing and criticizing 
supplanting of Youngstown framework by courts favoring Curtiss-Wright and other pro-presidential 
precedent). 
310 Id. at 204. 
311 KOH, supra note 30, at 134-44 (describing “the problem of judicial tolerance” at present). 
312 HOWELL 2003, supra note 32, at 172-74 (explaining persistence of judicial conservativism in 
cases involving presidential initiatives). 
313 The last caveat is simply to recognize that the federal government may be prohibited from 
doing certain things for extrinsic reasons, including because of the Bill of Rights. 
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3.  Any other basis for sustaining the action, or pretermitting an 
inquiry into its validity, is a question to be established by each 
relevant actor according to separate principles.  
 
Aside from its obvious virtue – three parts – this stripped-down framework may 
seem to say very little; its other virtue, though, is that it clarifies what Youngstown does 
and should not do.  Three differences are particularly worth highlighting. 
First, the alternative framework does not attempt to impose the same approach, in 
its entirety, on every potential actor.  As noted initially, Justice Jackson implied that his 
approach would be useful for both the executive branch and the judiciary,314 but he never 
explained why his categories, with their additive and subtractive analyses, should be 
applied to address constitutional questions outside of court.  Greater discrimination seems 
appropriate.  To the extent Justice Jackson’s concurrence, or an authoritative blending of 
the opinions in that case, supports the proposition that Congress may limit the President’s 
Commander-in-Chief authority (or any other substantive proposition), it should of course 
inform any legal analysis.  Any broader application of the existing framework by the 
President or Congress, however, seems problematic.  As noted in Part III, internalizing 
the framework is likely to encourage the executive branch to avoid petitioning Congress 
for fear of rejection or, alternatively, to seek legislative authorization by a means less 
likely to establish a repudiation.   
If the Youngstown framework continues to be applied in court, it is almost 
inevitable that executive branch lawyers will apply it as part of assessing litigation risk,315 
but it is doubtful that this tendency should be reinforced.  The executive branch probably 
ought not dwell on whether its powers are at their maximum, minimum, or in some zone 
of twilight, as if what matters is the level of scrutiny as opposed to the best understanding 
                                                 
314 See supra text accompanying notes 68-70. 
315 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 239 (discussing use of the Youngstown framework in 
Justice Department memoranda related to the TSP and the use of force in Haiti); see also Office of Legal 
Counsel, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Authority of the President Under Domestic and International Law to Use 
Military Force Against Iraq, 2002 WL 34462401 *7 (Oct. 23, 2002) (suggesting that, even prior to 
enactment of the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002, H.J. Res. 114, 
Pub. L. No. 107-243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002), that the President would be acting within Category One were 
he to initiate the use of force against Iraq).  
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of the Constitution;316 if such an approach is warranted, it requires more careful 
exploration in terms of executive branch values than has hitherto been accomplished.317  
Limiting this advisory use of the framework would be inconsistent with recent criticisms 
of executive branch legal opinions that failed to cite Youngstown.318  But those opinions’ 
more profound flaws had to do with their understanding of particular constitutional, 
statutory, and treaty provisions, and it is in any event possible to incorporate some of 
Youngstown’s values – like deference to Congress and its preferences – without 
importing wholesale Justice Jackson’s concurrence.   
Second, unlike the Youngstown framework, the suggested framework makes no 
overt judgment about the significance of Congress’s non-statutory gestures.  If these are 
part of the otherwise-prevailing approach to statutory interpretation, that is another 
matter, and this Article does not purport to resolve the merits of their use in that broader 
enterprise.319  It is doubtful, however, that existing doctrine makes them the equal of 
more explicit formal acts, as would appear to be the case under the Youngstown 
framework.  Equally important, the Youngstown framework’s attempt to convert implicit 
indications into a device for determining the standard of review for constitutional claims 
should be reexamined, or at least acknowledged as a fundamental form of constitutional 
lawmaking in itself.320   
Third, and still more basically, the new framework does not differentiate between 
degrees of judicial scrutiny – nor, indeed, is there any attempt to establish a standard of 
scrutiny at all.  As noted previously, Justice Jackson’s categories effectively sort the 
circumstances of congressional behavior and reckon the standard of scrutiny to be applied 
                                                 
316 Walter E. Dellinger et al., Principles to Guide the Office of Legal Counsel (2004), reprinted in 
54 UCLA L. REV. 1559 app. 2, at 1604, 1605 (stressing that the Office of Legal Counsel should provide 
“its best view of all legal constraints, and not only legal constraints likely to lead to judicial invalidation of 
executive branch action”). 
317 For a model of how this might proceed, see Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in 
the Executive Branch, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1189, 1220-28 (2006) (discussing OLC guidance relating to 
constitutional avoidance canons in terms both of judicial and executive branch values). 
318 See supra text accompanying note 17. 
319 See supra text accompanying note 108 (noting arguments for using congressional soft law in 
interpreting statutes). 
320 As such, it is a curious inversion of the much-criticized tendency of recent Supreme Court case 
law to establish constitutional norms via clear-statement rules governing separation of powers (and other) 
disputes.  See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992). 
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within each category.  Their most basic proposition, that courts should intervene in some 
of these cases and not in others, was not adequately defended, and sounds in principles of 
abstention that pose much broader issues.  Of course, not all separation of powers 
disputes require judicial administration, but if it is appropriate for the courts to stay out of 
any particular dispute, the usual judicial tools remain.   
The third prong of the alternative framework puts this succinctly.  As it suggests, 
each branch may need to apply its own substantive and procedural doctrines as 
appropriate to its institutional function; for the judiciary, this may involve determining 
the threshold issues like whether a dispute is justiciable,321 whether a constitutional 
question need be reached,322 and of course the proper level of scrutiny.323  Judgments on 
these questions often differ, to say the least, and it is a mistake to bundle all of these 
ingredients into the framework’s more specific undertaking – in part because it prevents 
these other doctrines from evolving apace. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Justice Jackson could not have anticipated the popularity of his “somewhat over-
simplified grouping of practical situations”324 – nor, despite the ingenious way his 
framework responded to the capacity of the President for unilateral action, could he have 
guessed at the range of strategic behaviors that courts and the political institutions would 
exploit once they had internalized his framework.  The techniques of positive political 
economy, and over fifty years of experience, give us a considerable advantage.  The 
issue, it should be reiterated, is not merely one of analytic clarity or rhetorical appeal 
(two pursuits in which Justice Jackson is difficult to better), nor need there be concern for 
                                                 
321 See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228 (1993) (“A controversy is nonjusticiable – 
i.e., involves a political question – where there is a ‘textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of 
the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards 
for resolving it . . .’”) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). 
322 See, e.g., Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944) (indicating that 
constitutional questions should be avoided if a case may be decided on narrower statutory grounds). 
323 See, e.g., West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 667-71 (1943) (Jackson, J.) 
(citing James Bradley Thayer concerning judicial restraint); see also James B. Thayer, The Origin and 
Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 148-56 (1893) (advocating 
judicial restraint in the absence of clear constitutional error by the political branches). 
324 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
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the overall vitality of executive branch authority (one pursuit in which the President is 
difficult to better).  The concern, rather, is that the Youngstown framework in important 
respects tends to disserve the institution it is thought to benefit – Congress – without fully 
justifying the choices that produce those perverse consequences.  The end result, 
optimally, is to highlight and refine the leading virtue of Youngstown: the privileging of 
legislative over executive branch authority, to the (uncertain) extent that the latter is 
defeasible, and counteracting a tactical advantage the President holds even its 
exploitation is lawless.  This legacy of Justice Jackson’s seems to be beyond re-
seizing,325 and it may be the most essential piece of the puzzle. 
                                                 
325 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 n.23 (2006) (“Whether or not the President has 
independent power, absent congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not 
disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his powers. See 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, . . . (Jackson, J., concurring). The Government does not argue 
otherwise.”). 
